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The Costs of Having (Too) Many
Choices
RESHAPING THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED
CONSENT
Maytal Gilboa† & Omer Y. Pelled††
INTRODUCTION
For the last century, tort law has placed liability on
physicians for treating patients without their consent.1 The modern
doctrine of informed consent has been around for over fifty years.2
This doctrine, which was debated vigorously by legal and medical
scholars when first introduced,3 is widely accepted nowadays.
Cases of informed consent can be divided into two main
types: lack of consent and insufficient information. The first type
† Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Toronto Faculty of Law; Ph.D., Tel Aviv
University Faculty of Law.
†† Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Industrial Engineering, the Iby and
Aladar Fleischman Faculty of Engineering, Tel Aviv University; Adjunct Professor, TelAviv University Faculty of Law; Ph.D., Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law.
For very helpful comments, we thank Lisa Bernstein, Hanoch Dagan, David Enoch, Amit
Erdinast-Ron, Shiran Gabay-Pelled, Ehud Guttel, Sharon Hannes, Alon Harel, Nira
Liberman, Omri Rachum-Twaig, Ohad Somech, Avraham Tabbach, Asaf Wiener, and
the participants of the Michigan Law 2016 Young Scholars’ Conference and of the
Private Law Forum at Tel Aviv University. In particular, we thank Ariel Porat for his
priceless comments and suggestions for this Article throughout various stages of its
writing. Last, we thank the Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law at
Tel Aviv University for its generous financial support.
1 Case law about informed consent to medical procedures dates back to the
late nineteenth century. Most cases recognized a duty to get consent, however, only
insofar as informing the patient and getting her to consent to the procedure served a
medical purpose. The first major case that found a doctor liable for lack of consent was
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914). In Schloendorff, and other
cases of that period, liability was based on assault, battery, or trespass, and was applied
only to cases where doctors performed a procedure without even mentioning it to the
patient. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 114–23 (1986).
2 The notion of informed consent was first introduced in Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (stating that “[a]
physician violates his duty to his patient . . . if he withholds any facts which are necessary
to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment”).
3 See, e.g., Peter V. Coffey, Assault on Informed Consent, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 447,
447 (1976) (describing the debate over informed consent at the time the New York
legislature added the medical malpractice statute to the state’s Public Health Law).
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consists of cases wherein a physician performs a medical
procedure on the patient without telling the patient about the
procedure, and therefore without receiving the patient’s consent
to such procedure. Under the second type, the physician tells the
patient about the medical procedure but does not supply the
patient with sufficient information about it. In the latter type of
cases, the law finds the patient’s consent void, as the patient was
not informed of all relevant information. This second type
comprises two general categories of insufficient information. The
first consists of cases in which the physician did not inform the
patient of a possible risk.4 The second includes cases in which
the physician did not inform the patient of an alternative
possible treatment to the patient’s illness.5
These two categories of cases concerning physicians’
provision of insufficient information raise distinct questions.
The former raises the question of the extent to which physicians
are required to inform their patients about the risks of the
medical treatment they are performing. The latter raises the
question of the extent to which physicians are required to inform
patients about all the alternative possible treatments for their
condition. The latter category of cases is the subject of this
article. Consider the following example:
Example 1. Alternate procedures. John is diagnosed with a serious
illness for which there are three possible treatments, all of which are
likely to cure his disease. Treatment A entails possible complications
that put John’s arm at risk. Treatment B carries a small risk of
neurological harm. Treatment C has side effects, namely nausea and
vomiting, but a significantly lower risk of complications than that of
Treatments A and B.
Mary, John’s physician, informed John of treatments A and B, but did
not mention treatment C as a possible alternative. John chose
Treatment A, and subsequently, the risk to his arm materialized.
Should Mary be liable for John’s harm?

4 See, e.g., Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 676, 683–89 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (where
the court found the defendant-dentist liable for not informing the plaintiff of the possible
risk to the bone that the procedure of tooth extraction entails); Jackson v. State, 907 So.
2d 250, 261–62 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (where the court ruled for the plaintiff because the
doctor did not inform her that a myomectomy might result in the complete removal of
the uterus, and early onset menopause).
5 See, e.g., Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813
N.W.2d 627, 653–55 (Wis. 2012) (where the doctor failed to inform his patient of an
additional test. The court decided that although the test performed by the doctor was not
negligent in and of itself, the doctor breached his duty for not informing the patient of
the alternative test). Accord Keogan v. Holy Fam. Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Wash.
1980) (same); Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 78–81 (Wis. 1995) (same).
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Currently, the doctrine of informed consent imposes
liability on Mary if the following four conditions are met: (1)
Mary possessed information that a reasonable patient would
have wanted to know before choosing the treatment (the
standard); (2) Mary did not reveal this information to the patient
(breach); (3) the medical procedure resulted in an adverse
outcome (harm); and (4) it can be preponderantly proven that
had Mary revealed the information, John would not have
suffered the harm (factual causation).6
According to prevailing law, to secure informed consent,
a physician is required to tell the patient about all the relevant
alternative treatments for his or her medical condition, as well
as about the major risks and benefits that each alternative
treatment entails.7 The standard of disclosure is objective—the
physician is required to inform the patient of all the information
that might reasonably influence his or her decision. A physician
that fails to fulfill this requirement may be held liable in tort for
any physical harm materialized from the treatment. Thus, if
John suffered from physical harm as a result of Mary’s breach of
duty, she would be liable for John’s harm.
Since the purpose of the doctrine of informed consent is
to ensure the patient’s well-being, and since this doctrine
requires physicians to disclose all possible alternative
treatments to their patient, one can assume that the doctrine is
founded on the perception that such disclosure always increases
the patient’s well-being.
This article presents the argument that this perception of
the patient’s well-being is misguided. Drawing on scholarship in
psychology and behavioral economics, we claim that while indeed
a patient benefits from choosing a treatment from a variety of
possibilities, making this choice also entails costs for her. The
decision as to whether a patient should be informed about
alternative courses of treatment should take into account both her
costs and benefits from knowing about these alternatives.
6

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050:

(1) The following shall be necessary elements of proof . . . the alleged breach of
the duty to secure an informed consent by a patient . . . against a health care
provider: (a) That the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a
material fact or facts relating to the treatment; (b) That the patient consented to
the treatment without being aware of or fully informed of such material fact or
facts; (c) That a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would
not have consented to the treatment if informed of such material fact or facts; (d)
That the treatment in question proximately caused injury to the patient.
7 See, e.g., Jandre, 813 N.W.2d at 636 (“A ‘physician’s duty to inform is not
boundless.’ . . . The physician must disclose only ‘what is material to the patient’s decision,
i.e., all of the viable alternatives and risks of the treatment proposed.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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Currently, courts seem to consider—at least to some extent—the
benefits to the patients and the costs to the physician,8 while
ignoring the costs to the patient. We contend that the doctrine of
informed consent should be structured in accordance with not
only the benefits but also the costs to the patient.
We identify in this article several ways in which choice
making may benefit the patient—some of which are less familiar
to lawyers. More importantly, however, we identify various types
of costs the patient bears when being forced to choose among
alternative treatments.
The most obvious way in which the patient benefits from
choosing one treatment from amongst several options is that this
choice allows the patient to select the treatment that conforms
best to her personal preferences. Thus, if John, in our example,
is not afraid of nausea and vomiting, and is more concerned
about the risk to his arm from Treatment A, he would have
preferred Treatment C to Treatment A. We call this benefit
“finding the best alternative.” Furthermore, patients’ active
participation in a choice of treatment has well-documented
beneficial ramifications on the success of the treatment and their
satisfaction with it.9 Thus, even if John would have chosen
Treatment A had he known of Treatment C, he could have still
benefited by actively choosing the treatment out of three options
instead of two. We call this benefit “sense of control.” Lastly, in
some cases, patients can validate their personal beliefs and
express themselves to others through the choice of treatment.
For example, if a patient’s religious beliefs forbid the use of blood
transfers, the patient can express her religious devotion by
selecting to decline that treatment. We call this benefit the
“expressive function of choice.”
On the other hand, offering all possible alternatives is not
cost free for the patient. When choosing a treatment out of several
alternatives, a patient endures costs referred to here as the
“increased risk of mistake.” These costs manifest the negative
effect of making a wrong decision; that is, the loss a patient suffers
from choosing a treatment less suited to her set of preferences.
Common reasons for making such a mistake include lack of
sufficient information regarding the available alternatives and the
mental exhaustion resulting from the process of decision making
itself. To date, legal scholars have ignored this last cause of
8 See, e.g., Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine:
Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L.
REV. 413, 486–87 (1979).
9 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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mistakes. Psychological studies have found a connection between
the limitations of the patient’s mental and emotional resources
needed to make a choice and the risk of making a mistake. The
more complex a decision, the more resources a patient must invest
in making it.10 At a certain point, the patient might reach the limits
of these resources, which may lead her to choose mistakenly the
wrong alternative for her. In our example, John might make an
error if he lacks the mental resources required to choose. As the
number of alternatives offered to John increases, so does the risk
that he will ultimately select a treatment that does not ideally
coincide with his long-term interests.
Our review of the costs associated with the decisionmaking process identifies other types of costs as well. First,
offering John an additional alternative treatment requires him to
acquire information about the additional alternative. We call this
cost “acquiring information.” This cost might cause John to make
a mistake when choosing a treatment but affect him even if there
is no risk of mistake. In addition, John might feel regret after
making his choice, which constitutes the costs of wondering
whether one of the rejected treatments would have worked
better.11 We call the cost of regretting the choice after it was made
“experienced regret.” Moreover, patients might suffer from regret
even before making a choice. We call this cost “anticipated regret.”
These costs are correlated with the number of alternatives that
the patient must choose from. As the number of alternatives grow,
so does the costs of anticipated and experienced regret.
We argue that once the law considers not only the
benefits but also the costs of choice making, four changes must
be made to the current doctrine of informed consent: (1) a change
in the physician’s duty to disclose; (2) a change in the
requirement of causation; (3) a change in the way damages are
measured; and (4) a change in the objective nature of the
doctrine. We elaborate on these required changes below.
When courts set the standard of disclosure for physicians,
they currently balance the benefits that patients obtain from
having more alternatives to choose from against the costs that
the requirement to disclose more alternatives inflicts on others;
i.e., they only consider the costs that such a requirement may
10 The physical effort associated with the process of making a choice is
identified here separately as one of the costs generated from the process of decision
making. See infra notes 100–101 and accompanying text.
11 We distinguish between what we here term “anticipated regret,” referring to the
stress a person experiences in response to the possibility that she will regret her choice in the
future, and “experienced regret,” which denotes a negative feeling a person experiences after
making her choice, when considering the alternatives she rejected. See infra Section II.B.
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inflict upon the physicians and the medical system in general.12
When setting this standard, however, courts overlook the costs
that the choice of treatment creates for the patient herself.
Accordingly, the first doctrinal change we suggest is that a
patient should be informed about an additional alternative
treatment for her illness only insofar as this knowledge creates
less harm than good. Therefore, when adding the information
about an alternative treatment creates higher costs to the
patient and to others than benefit to the patient, depriving her
of that information should not constitute a wrong in the first
place. This change is motivated by the recognition that
presenting the patient with additional alternatives creates
information costs, increases the risk that she will choose the
wrong treatment, and increases her sense of both anticipated
and experienced regret. We argue that currently, courts do not
consider these costs when setting the standard.
A second change to the doctrine of informed consent
regards factual causation. Currently, to establish causation, the
patient is required to show that had he or she been fully informed,
he or she would not have undergone the same procedure, and, as
a result, would have avoided some physical harm.13 We argue,
however, that choosing his or her preferred treatment out of a
wide variety of alternatives increases the patient’s sense of
control over her life, which is not only beneficial in itself but also
increases the probability that the treatment will succeed.14 These
benefits do not depend on the specific treatment that the patient
ultimately chooses. Thus, when the physician violates the
standard, the physician should compensate the patient for the
loss of those benefits, regardless of whether the patient would
have chosen the same treatment anyway, had he or she been
informed about the alternatives.
The third change we suggest regards the estimation of
damages, and it is motivated by the desire to hold the negligent
physician accountable only for the harm that he or she created.
Currently, once the patient establishes causation between the
physician’s breach of duty to inform and the patient’s physical
harm, the physician is liable for the patient’s entire physical and

12 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV.
511, 514 (1997) (explaining that as patients do not internalize the full cost of medical care,
since most of them have some form of medical insurance, doctors consider the costs of
treatments when informing the patients of the potential treatments available).
13 See infra Section I.B.
14 See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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emotional harm.15 We argue that this practice might
overcompensate the patient. Since choice making entails some
costs, when the physician informs the patient of fewer alternatives,
he or she confers some benefit to that patient. Thus, by making the
physician liable for all of the physical and emotional harm, courts
currently disregard the benefit that the physician’s behavior
created for the patient. We argue that the compensation should be
adjusted downward to account for this benefit.
The fourth and last change to the doctrine of informed
consent regards the objective nature of the standard. Currently,
the law requires the physician to inform the patient of additional
alternative treatments if such knowledge might affect the
decision of a reasonable patient.16 This standard assumes that
all patients have the same desire to be informed. The analysis in
this article reveals this assumption to be mistaken. John might
be more, or less, interested in knowing about every possible
procedure than the average or reasonable person. There is no
reason to believe that all people are identical in their ability to
cope with complex decisions or in their desire to do so. We offer
a simple mechanism to accommodate the difference between
patients. This mechanism allows patients to determine the level
of disclosure they desire. Acceding to our suggestion, the regime
of informed consent would require, as a default, an extended
duty to disclose information, but the patient would be allowed to
opt out of that regime and authorize her physician to limit the
number of alternatives that the physician must present to her.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the
requirements of the doctrine of informed consent, as courts apply
it today. It shows that the doctrine is designed to serve patients,
and as such, it is based on the premise that patients are better off
when they are able to choose from all the available alternatives.
Furthermore, it reveals an inconsistency between the standard of
disclosure imposed on physicians by the doctrine of informed
consent and the courts’ current implementation of the doctrine—
specifically regarding the requirement of proof of causation and
the measurement of harm to the patient. Part II maps the positive
and negative effects on patients choosing between a greater
number of alternatives. Applying insights from studies in
15 See Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 314 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (explaining that
a plaintiff may “recover for any mental suffering that results from physical injury,
however slight, if the defendant’s negligence caused the physical injury”); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494 (Wash. 1983) (determining that parents who have
a cause of action for breach of informed consent that resulted in wrongful birth are
entitled to damages for pecuniary and emotional injuries); see also infra Section I.C.
16 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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psychology and behavioral economics that focus on the
implications of choice making, this Part offers a categorization of
the different costs and benefits of actively choosing a treatment,
vis-à-vis the patient’s well-being. Part III implements the insights
offered in Part II and shows four ways in which the doctrine of
informed consent should be reshaped. The Conclusion presents the
importance of the suggested changes to the doctrine of informed
consent and sums up the discussion.
I.

THE CURRENT FEATURES OF INFORMED CONSENT

The doctrine of informed consent requires physicians to
tell their patients about the relevant alternative treatments for
their medical condition, including the major advantages and
risks that each of these alternatives entails.17 When referring to
the motivations behind the doctrine of informed consent, courts
often state that a fundamental goal is to protect patients’ right
to choose what would happen to their body18 by allowing them to
actively participate in choosing the treatment for their ailment.19
In this Part, we review the way courts currently apply
the doctrine of informed consent. This review uncovers a
discrepancy between the doctrinal features of informed consent
as currently applied by courts and the interest that this doctrine
is presumed to serve according to the same courts. This
observation serves as our starting point to develop our main
arguments in Parts II and III.
The following sections review the three basic elements of
the doctrine of informed consent as currently implemented by
the courts. These three elements are the standard of disclosure,
the requirement of factual causation, and the current practice of
awarding damages.
A.

The Standard of Disclosure

The doctrine of informed consent requires physicians to
disclose information to their patients about their medical
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (R.I. 1972) (stating that
informed consent is based on “the patient’s right to be the final judge to do with his body as
he wills”); Hannemann v. Boyson, 698 N.W.2d 714, 727–28 (Wis. 2005) (“[T]he right
to informed consent arises not from anything peculiar to the medical profession, but from
the ‘notion that an adult has a “right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”’”)
(quoting Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Wis. 1999)).
19 See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The
doctrine is intended to coexist with medically acceptable treatment forms. It seeks to allow a
competent patient to weigh the value of the treatment against the risks posed. . . . The goal is
to make the patient an active participant in the decisionmaking process.” (citations omitted)).
17
18
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condition, the alternative treatments for it, and the possible
consequences of each of these treatments.20 Moreover, courts
have required physicians who are not certain of their diagnosis
to inform their patient of any additional diagnostic tests
available,21 as well as the possible implications that each test
might entail for the patient.22 These requirements of disclosure,
however, are not limitless. Conveying all the theoretically
available information to each patient is clearly impractical.
Physicians must undergo rigorous studying for several years to
acquire all the information needed to treat each of their
patients.23 What, then comprises this “full disclosure” that
physicians are required to provide their patients? When should
a physician be considered to have supplied enough information
to enable her patient to make an informed choice?
Courts often acknowledge that the line between
information that should and should not be disclosed is not easily
drawn.24 In the relatively short period since the doctrine was first
20 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding
that physicians should disclose “the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed
treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient
remains untreated”); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398, 411 (La. 1988) (stating
that the information that the physician reveals to the patient should include “the nature of
the pertinent ailment or condition, the general nature of the proposed treatment or
procedure, the risks involved in the proposed treatment or procedure, the prospects of
success, the risks of failing to undergo any treatment or procedure at all, and the risks of
any alternate methods of treatment”); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180, 194 (N.M. 1978)
(holding that the treating physician must communicate to the patient information
concerning “the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives
to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated”); Keogan
v. Holy Fam. Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1253–54 (Wash. 1980) (stating that informed consent
is not limited to the administration of treatment, but rather extends to all important
decisions that must be made during medical care).
21 See, e.g., Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d
627, 653–55 (Wis. 2012) (holding that, where a doctor failed to inform a patient of an
additional test, the doctor breached his duty by not informing the patient of the alternative,
even though the act of not performing the additional test was not negligent in and of itself).
Accord Keogan, 622 P.2d 1246 at 1254; Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 78–79 (Wis. 1995).
22 See, e.g., Flyte v. Summit View Clinic, 333 P.3d 566, 568–69, 576–77 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2014) (patient died from swine flu that her physicians misdiagnosed, while offering
no diagnosis at the time of discharge. The court held that the physicians had to inform the
patient of this possibility. By failing to do so, they breached their duty of informed consent.).
23 To become a specialist, most physicians must study for four years in a premed degree, four years in medical school, and then complete another three to seven years
of residency. See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., POLICY PRIORITIES TO IMPROVE THE
NATION’S HEALTH 1–2 (2016) https://www.aamc.org/download/472838/data/policypriorities-improve-nations-health.pdf [https://perma.cc/AND3-K9VT]. Obviously, not all
the information that the physician gathered in these years is relevant to a specific
patient, but even a small fraction of it is too much information. In practice, society
encourages professionals in any field to specialize in some subject matter specifically
because it is not presumed possible (or even desirable) that everyone knows everything.
24 Gerety, 589 P.2d at 194 (in one of the leading informed consent cases in New
Mexico, the state Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is no bright line separating the
significant from the insignificant; the answer in any case must abide a rule of reason”).
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introduced in 1957,25 courts have considered several guidelines for
its delineation. First, courts have stressed that physicians must
disclose all the feasible alternative treatments and medical tests.26
Second, courts have addressed the content of the information that
physicians need to convey regarding each of the alternatives they
disclose to their patients. For example, when telling a patient about
possible treatments or diagnostic tests, a physician must disclose
what each of these treatments or tests is designed to accomplish,
as well as the risks and success rates of each.27
Notably, however, in most jurisdictions, the information
that physicians are required to provide their patient is limited
by its relevance to the decision making of a reasonable patient.28
Accordingly, physicians have no duty to disclose immaterial
risks to their patients.29 The materiality of the risk is determined
by objective terms! Such a determination takes into account the
probability of the adverse result of each procedure or test,
alongside the possible magnitude of its potential harm.30
Furthermore, physicians are not required to disclose to their
patients a risk of treatment if this risk is perceived to be obvious
or commonly known.31 In some states, the legislature sets the
25 The California Supreme Court first introduced the modern doctrine of
informed consent in 1957, in its decision in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). Sixty years have passed since the Salgo
decision—a short time in terms of common law legal doctrines.
26 A physician only has a duty to disclose information about medically
recognized treatments for the patient’s condition. See LeBlanc v. Islam, 164 So. 281, 292
(La. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that physicians must only disclose alternative treatments
that are accepted as feasible).
27 See Shannon v. Fusco, 89 A.3d 1156, 1169–70 (Md. 2014) (the court held that
a physician has a duty to disclose “the nature of the ailment, . . . the probability
of success of the contemplated therapy and its alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate
consequences associated with such treatment”) (citing Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014,
1020 (Md. 1977)). Accord Hannemann v. Boyson, 698 N.W.2d 714, 725 (Wis. 2005).
28 Some jurisdictions refer to the test as the “prudent patient rule,” that is,
physicians must disclose risks that might have influenced the decision of a prudent
patient. See, e.g., Jaskoviak v. Gruver, 638 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (N.D. 2002).
29 But see Katherine Shaw & Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and
Regulatory Spillover, 92 IND. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2016) (contending against the regime of
informed consent with regards to abortions adopted in several states, according to which,
before performing an abortion, physicians are required to inform their patients about
remote risks, such as the risk of suffering from post-abortion depression. The writers
acknowledge that autonomists might support this regime, as it offers women more
information about the procedure without restricting their access to abortion. However,
the writers exclaim that this conclusion is wrong since exposing these women to remote
risks imposes on them an excessive amount of information, which might mislead them
into making the wrong decision for them.).
30 See id. at 17–18 (stating that the materiality of the risk is an objective test
determined by the likelihood of the potential injury and its severity, should it occur).
31 See, e.g., Dills v. N.M. Heart Inst., P.A., 367 P.3d 467, 471 (N.M. Ct. App.
2015) (holding that a physician is under no duty to disclose risks that the patient already
knew, or risks inherent to the treatment that persons of average sophistication are aware
of); Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 371 (S.D. 1985) (stating that there is no duty

2019]

RESHAPING THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

377

definition of an obvious or commonly known risk.32 This article
focuses on the prevailing requirement imposed on physicians to
disclose all the relevant alternatives to their patients, rather
than on the content of such information.
Under some circumstances, physicians might conclude
that the best course of treatment for their patient is simply doing
nothing. Indeed, courts acknowledged that in certain instances,
lack of treatment can be considered a treatment. Therefore, a
physician who believes that the best course of treatment for her
patient is to do nothing must disclose this option to her patient
as a valid alternative among the potential treatments for her
ailment.33 In other words, at present, physicians must obtain
their patients’ informed consent even for doing nothing.34
The exception to this extensive disclosure requirement is
the case in which several physicians are treating the same
patient. Generally, courts have accepted that when several
physicians treat a patient, only one of them is obligated to obtain
her informed consent to the treatment.35 Hence, a physician who
knows that a patient was already informed of her medical
condition and its potential treatments by a colleague is not
required to provide this patient similar information to obtain
informed consent.36 Similarly, when a family doctor refers her
patient to a specialist to perform a certain procedure, the family
doctor is not required to obtain the patient’s informed consent
for this procedure, as this duty falls on the specialist who
actually administers the procedure.37
to discuss minor risks inherent in common procedures, while “known risk of death or
serious bodily harm” should always be disclosed).
32 See, e.g., N.M. R. ANN., CIV. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 13-1104B (1998)
(stating that juries should address risks as known or obvious either when it is evident
that the patient already knew the information not disclosed by the physician or when
this information is “a matter of common understanding”).
33 See Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180, 192 (N.M. 1978) (treating physician
must communicate to the patient the likely results if the patient remains untreated,
among other duties).
34 See, e.g., Keogan v. Holy Fam. Hosp., 622 P2d 1246, 1255 (Wash. 1980)
(stating that “the ‘treatment’ encompasses all aspects of patient care, including the
doctor’s resolve to do nothing about medical abnormalities in the patient’s condition”)
35 See, e.g., Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1155–57 (Wash. 2007)
(holding that any exception from informed consent requires a medical emergency).
36 See, e.g., Dills, 367 P.3d at 468–71 (holding that once a patient is made aware
of all relevant information, a second physician is not obligated to explain all these again.
Here, the plaintiff, a heart patient, was examined by a cardiologist, who explained the risks
of the recommended procedure, as well as alternative treatments. Later, the patient met
with the defendant, a cardiothoracic surgeon, who administered the treatment. The
plaintiff told the defendant that she already heard about the risks and gave consent.).
37 See, e.g., Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 306 (Conn. 1983)
(holding that a referring physician had no obligation to inform a patient of alternative
procedures); Hopkins v. Mills-Kluttz, 77 S.W.3d 624, 627–28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that
“[a] referring physician is not liable for the negligence of the treating physician if the referring
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Although courts do not always specify which considerations
led them to set the scope of the duty of disclosure to patients, many
clearly indicate that protecting patients’ right to choose their own
course of treatment is one of them.38 This corresponds with the
conventional belief that enabling patients to participate in a decision
that might have significant implications for their lives, such as the
treatment for their medical condition, serves their best interests.
To conclude thus far: according to prevailing law,
physicians are required to disclose to their patients all the
possible tests and treatments relevant to their condition. Both
legislatures and courts exempt physicians from that duty,
however, when the risks associated are perceived as obvious or
otherwise previously known to the patient. This exemption lowers
the costs that the wide disclosure regime entails for physicians
and for the medical system in general.
B.

Factual Causation

Imposing liability for breach of informed consent
currently hinges upon the result of the but-for test. Thus, to
establish his or her claim, a patient must first show that had the
physician appropriately disclosed to her the information about
alternative treatments for her ailment, he or she would have
chosen a different treatment than the one he or she had actually
chosen. Furthermore, the plaintiff must also show that had he
or she chosen a different treatment, the unfortunate result that
occurred would have been prevented.39 To illustrate the method
currently applied by courts when implementing the but-for test,
consider the following example.
Example 2. Factual causation. Jeremy is diagnosed with a serious
heart condition. If it remains untreated, he faces death. There are two
possible courses of treatment for Jeremy: A and B. Both are likely to
cure him. Treatment A entails a 10% risk of 50 to Jeremy’s arm, while
Treatment B entails a 10% risk of 100 to Jeremy’s leg. Harriet,
Jeremy’s physician, informs him only of Treatment A. Jeremy agrees

physician merely referred the patient whereupon the treating physician assumed
responsibility, did not participate in the operation, was not alleged to be negligent in his
referral, and was not claimed to be engaged in any partnership with the treating physician.”);
Koapke v. Herfendel, 660 N.W.2d 206, 214 (N.D. 2003) (referring dentist had no duty to secure
the patient’s informed consent, unless he retains control over the patient’s treatment).
38 See supra notes 18–19.
39 See, e.g., Shabinaw v. Brown, 963 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Idaho 1998) (indicating
that to prove causation, a plaintiff must show both that a reasonable person would have
chosen a different course of treatment than the one administered, and that had she
chosen the different treatment, the outcome would have been different).
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to Treatment A, the risk to his arm materializes, and he suffers a
harm of 50.40
Should Harriet compensate Jeremy?

In this type of case, common law courts tend to exempt
physicians from tort liability due to the lack of factual causation.41
A court would only impose liability on Harriet if Jeremy could
prove that had he been informed of both treatments, he would
have chosen the treatment that entails risk to his leg rather than
his arm, even though the objective risk to his arm was lower.
Jeremy would thus have to prove that although Treatment A
exposed him to a risk of 5 (10%*50) and Treatment B to a risk of
10 (10%*100), he would still have chosen the latter. Since
Jeremy’s claim is based on personal preference, which is
subjective in nature, this inference is very hard to prove.42
Accordingly, in Example 2, a court would probably conclude that
even if Jeremy had been informed of both Treatment A and B, he
would have chosen Treatment A and would have ultimately
experienced the same harm. In this case, Harriet’s failure to
obtain Jeremy’s consent would not be considered the cause of
Jeremy’s harm, and Harriet would be absolved of tort liability.43
40 An example of such a choice of treatment is a coronary artery bypass grafting
procedure, in which a blood vessel is harvested from the arm or leg to graft a cardiac bypass.
The choice of blood vessel can influence the long-term success of the treatment, but also
creates different complications for patients’ limbs. See Charles C. Canver, Conduit Options
in Coronary Artery Bypass, 108 CHEST 1150, 1150–53 (1995) (analyzing the considerations
for the choice of conduit). For possible long-term complications following harvesting of blood
vessel from legs, see R. Garland, F.A. Frizelle, B.R. Dobbs & H. Singh, A Retrospective Audit
of Long-Term Lower Limb Complications following Leg Vein Harvesting for Coronary
Artery Bypass Grafting, 23 EURO. J. CARDIO-THORACIC SURGERY 950 (2003); Christian E.
Paletta, David B. Huang, Andrew C. Fiore, Marc T. Swartz, Francisco L. Rilloraza & Jan
E. Gardner, Major Leg Wound Complications After Saphenous Vein Harvest for Coronary
Revascularization, 70 ANNALS THORACIC SURGERY 492 (2000). For possible long-term
complications from harvesting a blood vessel from the arm, see Alessandro Maria Budillon,
Francesco Nicolini, Andrea Agostinelli, Cesare Beghi, Giovanni Pavesi, Claudio Fragnito,
Marzio Busi & Tiziano Gherli, Complications After Radial Artery Harvesting for Coronary
Artery Bypass Grafting: Our Experience, 133 SURGERY 283 (2003).
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 18 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (stating the general requirement of causation as
a preliminary condition for justifying liability in negligence in “failure-to-warn” cases).
42 We assume that the scope of the harm is measured objectively, for example
by representing the reduction in the range and strength of the limb. People with different
occupations or hobbies have different uses for their limbs and can thus ascribe different
value to their legs and arms. Jeremy would have to prove that for him, a risk of 5 to his
arm is greater than a risk of 10 to his leg in subjective terms.
43 For the argument that the proof of causation in medical cases of informed
consent is almost impossible to establish, see, for example, Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that finding what the patient would have done had
she been informed “hardly represents more than a guess”); see also Aaron D. Twerski &
Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable
Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 609 (1988) (arguing that the difficulties arising from
the but-for test in informed consent cases should be countered by focusing on the
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Consider now a variation of Example 2: suppose that
Harriet administers Treatment A without asking for Jeremy’s
consent at all. In most jurisdictions, this change of detail would
have a significant effect on the applied legal regime. Since
Jeremy did not give his consent for the treatment, this case
would be classified as battery or trespass on a person, rather
than as a case of negligence.44 Accordingly, in most jurisdictions,
courts would allow patients to recover a small amount in
damages even if they cannot prove that the physician’s behavior
was the but-for cause of their injury, i.e., regardless of whether
they could establish causation.45 Such rulings leave a patient
who was not asked to consent to a treatment in a far better
condition than a patient whose physician did not disclose to her
the alternative treatments for her ailment, and thus in
practicality did not obtain her permission for the treatment
either. In the latter cases, classified as falling under negligence
law (as illustrated in Example 2), the patient will not be able to
recover damages in a claim for breach of informed consent unless
he or she can establish causation.
The requirement of factual causation in cases of informed
consent is arguably consistent with the notion that tort law aims
to protect people’s bodily integrity. However, if this doctrine is
concerned only with protecting the patient’s bodily integrity,
why do we need it in the first place? Why should not the law
plaintiff ’ s loss of value resulting from the withholding of adequate information). Note
that had Harriet performed Treatment B, the riskier treatment, instead of Treatment A,
Jeremy could easily prove causation. However, as Treatment B is objectively more
dangerous than Treatment A, Harriet would have been liable for malpractice, since she
performed the objectively riskier treatment.
44 See, e.g., Orduno v. Mowry, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1432, at 3–5, 25–
26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding partially liable a defendant plastic surgeon who used
silicon-filled breast implants against the expressed wishes of the plaintiff. Plaintiff later
became ill and argued that her illness was caused by the implant. The court denied her
damages for the physical harm for lack of causation, but found the defendant liable for
the plaintiff ’ s mental suffering, as this case is one of battery and not negligence); Rolater
v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 97–98 (Okla. 1913) (holding that performing surgery without express
consent constitutes trespass on person. This case was decided by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in response to a physician removing a bone from the patient’s foot during surgery
without the patient’s consent.); Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742, 745, 748
(Pa. 2002) (holding that that defendant is liable in battery where defendant implanted
an inflatable pump prosthesis in patient’s penis without his consent).
45 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Kull, 329 F.2d 168, 169 (7th Cir. 1964) (awarding a patient
$500 for unauthorized removal of a mole, based on battery); Bailey v. Belinfante, 218
S.E.2d 289, 290, 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (finding grounds for a cause of action where the
defendant removed an extra sixteen teeth during dental procedure allegedly without the
patient’s consent. The court of appeals stated that if the jury could have found that the
appellant did not consent to the extraction of teeth as a matter of fact, then this
procedure “constituted a technical battery.”); Rolater, 137 P. at 96–97, 100 (affirming a
judgment in the amount of a $1000 for a necessary procedure that was undertaken
without the patient’s consent).
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simply impose liability on physicians for faulty choices of
treatments that cause physical harm to their patients,
regardless of whether these patients gave their prior informed
consent to these treatments? The answer to these questions is
clear. The doctrine of informed consent aims to protect patients’
right to choose, independent of their right to receive adequate,
nonnegligent medical care.46 Standing on its own, the breach of
the patients’ right to choose should have separate implications
from the physical harm that the breach could have caused to the
patient. This latter harm is already covered by the duty of care
that physicians hold toward their patients.
As such, the current implementation of the doctrine of
informed consent, which hangs on the proof of the existence of
physical harm, is misaligned with the standard of disclosure
embedded in the doctrine.47 We attend to the implications of this
argument in Part III.
C.

Assessing Damages

The third element of the doctrine of informed consent
concerns the assessment of damages. When a plaintiff successfully
proves that the physician breached the duty to disclose relevant
information, and establishes a causal relationship between that
breach and his or her subsequent physical harm, courts tend to
award compensation to the plaintiff covering the amount of the
entire physical harm.48 Interestingly, in most jurisdictions, courts
reduce the amount of compensation according to the harm that
would have occurred under the alternative course of treatment.
That is, if the defendant can show that he or she has also prevented
another harm to the plaintiff by breaching the duty to get informed
consent, the assessment of damages would be lessened by the
amount of that benefit to the plaintiff.49
See supra notes 18–19.
For the general argument that the elements of liability—i.e., the standard
of care and causation—should be aligned, see Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law,
121 YALE L.J. 82, 84–87 (2011).
48 See Fanguy v. Lexington Ins. Co., 210 So. 3d 483, 495–97 (La. Ct. App. 2016)
(holding that the defendant breached the duty of informed consent when they performed a
partial hysterectomy without offering the patient a nonsurgical alternative. The court
found the defendant liable for the patient’s harm).
49 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“The
rule stated in this Section normally requires that the damages allowable for an interference
with a particular interest be diminished by the amount to which the same interest has been
benefited by the defendant’s tortious conduct.”); id. § 920 cmt. a, illus. 2 (“A, a surgeon,
without B’s consent, operates upon B’s eye, causing B to lose the sight in that eye. In an
action of battery, it may be shown in mitigation of damages for the loss of the eye that had
A not operated, the sight of the other eye would have been lost.”). But see Warren v.
Schecter, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 576–77, 581–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the
46
47
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We contend that, similar to the requirement of factual
causation, this prevailing practice of awarding damages in cases
of informed consent reaffirms that the interest currently
protected by this doctrine is the patient’s bodily integrity. Since
the doctrine aims to protect the patient’s interest in making an
informed choice, basing damages solely on physical harm is
again inconsistent with this goal. Specifically, this method of
assessing damages expresses the net physical harm caused to
the patient by the treatment that was administered without
obtaining informed consent. Like the requirement of factual
causation, this method does not involve any estimation of the
harm that the physician caused to the patient by taking the
choice of treatment from him or her. As we elaborate in Part III,
courts should take into account the harms and benefits resulted
to the plaintiff from depriving him or her of the full ability to
choose in addition to the net harm to his or her bodily integrity.
***
A review of the three basic elements of the current
implementation of the doctrine of informed consent reveals that
this implementation does not reflect the harm resulting from the
patient’s loss of choice. We find this inference somewhat surprising
considering courts’ assertion that a chief goal of this doctrine is to
protect patients’ right to choose, especially in regard to a matter
that might influence their lives tremendously.
The following Part provides the theoretical and doctrinal
framework necessary to account for plaintiffs’ loss of choice as a
specific interest. In particular, it introduces the different sorts
of benefits and costs that the process of making choices entails
for choice-makers. This mapping of benefits and costs of making
choices is crucial for aligning the implementation of the doctrine
of informed consent with the chief goal that underlies this
doctrine: protecting patients’ well-being.
II.

ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CHOICE

The previous Part offered a critical review of the current
practice of the doctrine of informed consent, while focusing on its
three basic elements. Having revealed the problems in the
implementation of the doctrine of informed consent, we can take
another step forward towards reshaping the doctrine to align it
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for the entire harm caused by a gastric surgery,
which caused her to develop a bone disease but also cured her stomach ulcer, since the
defendant who performed the surgery failed to disclose some of the associated risks and
therefore did not receive the plaintiff ’ s informed consent).
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with its goal of protecting patients’ informed choice. This Part
takes the additional step needed towards this end, as it
identifies the benefits and costs entailed for patients in the
process of making choices.
The following sections present the positive and negative
effects that patients obtain from the process of choosing—before,
during, and after making the choice. We present these positive and
negative effects of making choices, inter alia, by integrating
empirical studies from the fields of behavioral economics and
psychology which show that an increase in the number of
alternatives to choose from might have both beneficial and
detrimental implications on peoples’ well-being. This suggested
classification provides useful guidance for reshaping the standard
of disclosure, so as to reflect a balance between the benefits and
costs associated with having more alternatives to choose from, as
well as for the assessment of the harm caused to patients when this
standard is breached.
A.

The Benefits of Choice

A patient derives many benefits from having more
alternative treatments or diagnostic tests to choose from, namely:
(1) the benefit gained from vindicating the patient’s sense of
control by choosing her treatment; (2) the benefit that derives
from finding the best alternative treatment for the patient; and
(3) the benefit a patient obtains from expressing herself through
her choice. When a physician withholds from the patient the
relevant information necessary for making an informed choice
regarding treatment, this physician deprives the patient of these
benefits (in whole or in part).
1. Sense of Control
The ability to choose from a variety of alternatives
generates what we term here a “sense of control.” This benefit
manifests the positive value a person obtains from the experience
of influencing the course of one’s own life,50 i.e., the enjoyment a
person derives from the exercise of her power to choose about

50 This article focuses on the instrumental value of choice rather than on its
intrinsic significance. Notably, however, holding a person’s right to choose as valuable
in and of itself—regardless of any external advantage an individual may derive—can be
interpreted as a ‘benefit’ of choice. As long as the value of this benefit is finite, and can
be measured against other benefits and costs, the intrinsic value of the right to choose
can be incorporated into our analysis.
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himself or herself.51 The existence of this benefit explains the
common presumption that most patients prefer to be offered a
range of possible treatments from which to select the treatment
most suited to their preferences,52 rather than have the very same
treatment chosen for them.53 The intuition behind this
presumption is that being capable of choosing his or her own
medical treatment, in itself, positively influences the patient’s
well-being, regardless of the specific course of treatment he or she
eventually chooses or its outcome.54 This intuition is supported by
recent empirical studies.55 Particularly illuminating in this respect
are studies on terminal patients, conducted in Washington and
Oregon, that confirm the significance that experiencing control

51 Stated otherwise, for every possible outcome people generally prefer a state
of the world in which that outcome came about because of their active choice. The
difference between a person’s overall utility in a world that is generated from others’
decisions and the same state of the world when it results from their own active choice is
the benefit they derive from the sense of control.
52 Different treatments may entail different risks of complications, side effects,
monetary costs, recovery time, etc.
53 This reflects an intuition that is shared among moral philosophers about the
difference between actual consent and hypothetical consent. Hypothetical consent is
described as a situation where a person did not give her explicit consent where such
consent was morally needed, but we can assume that a rational and fully informed
person would have given his or her consent. For a critical view of hypothetical consent,
see David Enoch, Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy, 128 ETHICS 6, 9
(2017) (“Understood in this way, the thought that hypothetical consent can substitute
for consent doesn’t sound more plausible than the thought that if you’re thirsty and
there’s no water around, it may be good enough that there would have been water, under
suitably described hypothetical conditions.”).
54 See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984)
(wherein Katz argues that patients are not involved enough in their own treatment, mainly
due to doctors’ misconception regarding what is good for their patients). Following Katz’s
intuition, other studies have shown that patients who have more control over their
treatment are more satisfied with their medical care and show better long-term results
from the treatment. See infra note 55. But see BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE:
WHY MORE IS LESS, 30–33 (1st ed. 2004) (arguing that the combination of choice of
treatment and the numerous treatment possibilities may result in poor choice of treatment
and strong feelings of doubt); CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS,
DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS 32–33 (1998) (arguing that the current debate on
patients’ autonomy has gone too far because, in practice, patients care less than is
commonly believed about being a part of the decision-making process).
55 For studies that have indicated a strong positive effect of the patient’s active
participation in the choice of treatment on the outcome of clinical intervention, see infra note
63; see also Sheldon Greenfield et al., Patients’ Participation in Medical Care: Effects on Blood
Sugar Control and Quality of Life in Diabetes, 3 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 448, 455–56 (1988)
(showing positive correlation between patients’ involvement in the choice of treatment and
both the increase in satisfaction from the treatment and their better long-term results from
it); Andreas Loh et al., The Impact of Patient Participation on Adherence and Clinical
Outcome in Primary Care of Depression, 65 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 69, 75–76 (2007)
(showing similar results, focusing on patients who are being treated for depression);
Shaghayegh Vahdat et al., Patient Involvement in Health Care Decision Making: A Review,
16 IRAN RED CRES MED. J., 6 (2014) (a meta-study finding that “participation of patients is
not merely for consultation, seeking opinions, or use of their actual and potential abilities, but
also participation should result in better rehabilitation of patients.”).
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over one’s own life has to that person’s well-being.56 The subjects
in these studies were patients who had requested end-of-life
treatment from their physicians; i.e., they sought to obtain lethal
doses of medication that would assist them to die on their own
terms in accordance with their states’ Death with Dignity Act.57
These studies found that the central reason behind this request
was patients’ fear of losing their ability to make choices regarding
their lives in general,58 and in particular regarding the medical
course that would suit their needs and desires when it is time to
make such a choice.59
The evaluation of sense of control is influenced mainly by
two factors: the importance of the decision to the choice maker
and the number of alternatives that the choice maker can choose
from. Regarding the former aspect, people seek a greater amount
of control when the choice to be made relates to a significant
aspect of their lives. For example, you may be slightly annoyed if
someone orders your meal for you at a restaurant but absolutely
outraged if someone decides for you which apartment to buy or
whom to marry. The choice of medical treatment is conventionally
perceived as significant to patients, and its significance increases
along with the potential that the specific choice at hand would
greatly affect the patient’s life.60 The effect that the number of
alternatives available to choose from has on the patient’s sense of
control is determined by the patient’s belief about what comprises
56 The mentioned studies were held in the state of Oregon, following the state’s
Death with Dignity Act (1997), and the state of Washington, following that state’s Death
with Dignity Act (2009). Both Acts require physicians who prescribe end-of-life treatment
to submit a report for each patient that includes both information about the patient’s health
at the time of the request and the concerns that led the patient to ask for the treatment.
The aggregate information about patients’ characteristics and concerns is published yearly
by each state. See OR. HEALTH AUTH., OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: 2017 DATA
SUMMARY 6 (2018); WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, WASHINGTON STATE DEATH WITH
DIGNITY ACT REP. 1, 8, 12 (2018).
57 See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–97
(West 2018); The Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.245.010–903 (West 2018).
58 In 2017, 87.4% of the patients in Oregon and 90% of the patients in
Washington listed loss of autonomy as one of their end-of-life concerns. See OR. HEALTH
AUTH. supra note 56, at 6.; WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 56, at 1.
59 Courtney S. Campbell, Ten Years of “Death with Dignity,” 22 NEW ATLANTIS
33, 44–45 (2008) (arguing that patients gave the words “autonomy” and “choice” the same
meaning and that they often thought of ‘dignity’ in this context as autonomy over the
manner and time of death).
60 However, patients who suffer from chronic, non-life-threatening, diseases
might perceive their choice of care as more important, since the disease and its
management become part of the patient’s identity and status. See, e.g., Cathy Charles,
Amiram Gafni & Tim Whelan, Shared Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What
Does It Mean? (Or It Takes at Least Two to Tango), 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 681, 681–82 (1997)
(mentioning that starting in the 1970s, there was a shift from acute care of illnesses to
chronic management of illnesses, which might explain the importance of shared decision
making by patients and their doctors).
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a reasonable number of alternatives that should be available to
her in order to make the informed choice of treatment for her
medical condition.61 This number may vary in accordance with the
patient’s awareness of the alternative treatments that other
patients in her condition have.62 Thus, if a patient knows that
most patients in his or her condition are usually given three
alternative treatments to choose from, and the patient is offered
four, he or she may experience a greater sense of control over his
or her life, compared to a scenario in which he or she is offered
only two alternatives. In the latter case, the patient’s sense of
control over his or her life may be weakened.
The experience of sense of control is beneficial not only
for psychological reasons. The opportunity to be an active
participant in the choice of treatment has been well-documented
as having long-term effects on the success of medical treatments,
in particular when the treatment’s success depends on the
patient’s self-control and involvement in the treatment, as in the
case of insulin injections and diet for patients with diabetes.63
Lastly, moral philosophy scholarship maintains that choice
making has an intrinsic value, as it allows people to exercise their
autonomy.64 Like the sense of control, this value does not depend
61 JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 118–19 (1st ed.
1966) (arguing that the importance of alternatives, which he calls behavioral freedoms, is
determined not only by the absolute number of alternatives that the choice maker attains,
but also by the proportion that number represents of alternatives available in general).
62 In general, the sense of control increases with the number of alternatives.
However, the size of the increased benefit from choosing depends on the total number of
alternatives. When a person who has only one alternative gets a second alternative to
choose from, his or her control over her life increases significantly. The more alternatives
a person has, the less that person will gain from each additional alternative.
63 Several researchers have shown a strong positive effect of the patient’s
active participation in the choice of treatment on the outcome of clinical intervention.
See, e.g., Michael Berger & Ingrid Mühlhauser, Diabetes Care and Patient-Oriented
Outcomes, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1676, 1676–77 (1999) (showing in a clinical trial that
patient’s active participation in choice of treatment is positively correlated with
adherence to treatment and improved health outcomes). Accord Michele Heisler et al.,
The Relative Importance of Physician Communication, Participatory Decision Making,
and Patient Understanding in Diabetes Self-Management, 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
243, 250 (2002) (the patient’s better adherence and improved outcomes are not a result
of an accurate choice of treatment, but rather of self-confidence in their self-care
capabilities); Michael L. Parchman, et al., Participatory Decision Making, Patient
Activation, Medication Adherence, and Intermediate Clinical Outcomes in Type 2
Diabetes: A STARNet Study, 8 ANNALS FAM. MED. 410, 415 (2010); see also supra note
54 (we account for this positive aspect of choice as part of the sense of control).
64 This observation adopts an instrumental view of autonomy. Some believe that
autonomy is a fundamental good, which cannot be commodified against other goods. We offer
a practical answer to this argument: as we have seen, informed consent is already limited by
the costs that it creates to the physicians and to the medical system at large. As such,
autonomy must be weighed against other costs and benefits. For further reading on the value
of autonomy as an independent good, see, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
424–25 (1986) (viewing autonomy as the ultimate good and choice between meaningful
alternatives as a mean to exercise autonomy); see also Enoch, supra note 53, at 30–35.
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on the alternative that the choice maker ultimately chooses; nor
does it depend on the outcome of the choice. Even though the idea
of realizing one’s autonomy through choices is beyond the scope of
this article, it seems that this idea might be incorporated into our
analysis, as a benefit of choice making.
2. Finding the Best Alternative
Economists maintain that having a range of alternatives is
beneficial for choice makers, since it allows them to choose the
alternative that is most consistent with their set of preferences,
thereby maximizing their welfare.65 The intuition behind this
argument is simple: when rational people are presented with several
alternatives and have complete information on each of them, they
will select the alternative that they believe will satisfy them the
most. As the number of alternatives grows, so are the chances of
finding the alternative that best corresponds with their preferences.
Therefore, having more alternatives increases the choice maker’s
expected benefit from the alternative ultimately chosen.
This argument also applies in the medical context. For
example, some people are extremely fearful of certain types of
risks, while other risks cause less concern. In Example 2,66 for
instance, Treatment A creates a risk of 50 to Jeremy’s arm, and
Treatment B creates a risk of a 100 to his leg. Although
objectively, Treatment A is better (as it creates lesser risk),
Jeremy might prefer to expose himself to a risk of 100 to his leg
than to a risk of 50 to his arm. This may be the case, for instance,
if Jeremy dreams to become a pianist in the future, or if his
favorite activity is sketching.67
The beneficial effect of finding the best alternative
continuously increases with every new alternative treatment
added to the patient’s set of possible treatments (disregarding
the information costs and the costs of decision making discussed
in the next section) since there is a chance that the patient will
prefer the added alternative over the former alternatives. With
65 See Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy and Utility, 95 ETHICS 5, 5–6 (1984)
(claiming that most utilitarians value autonomy instrumentally, as a tool for maximizing
preferences; but nonetheless suggesting that autonomy has intrinsic value on utilitarian
grounds); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 122 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Yale Univ. Press 2005) (1869) (“It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not
primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself.”).
66 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
67 The latter fact might affect Jeremy’s awarded amount of compensation
under current law. See Burgett v. Troy-Bilt LLC, No. 11-110-ART, 2011 WL 4715176, at
*2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2011) (stating that a ballerina or a professional athlete would ascribe
a higher value to their pinky toe than the average person).
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each added alternative, however, the size of this benefit
diminishes: the added value from having one more alternative is
greatest when you have very few alternatives and decreases as
the number of alternatives increases.68 Moreover, adding more
alternative treatments is only beneficial insofar as there is a
chance that the patient will choose the added alternative. Thus,
if we know with certainty that a patient would value a certain
treatment most, we know that the patient will not derive any
more benefit from being informed of additional possible
treatments.69 Conversely, when we are uncertain about a
patient’s preferences, offering more treatments to the patient’s
array of choices should increase the benefit he or she will
ultimately attain from choosing.
Notably, the added value of each additional treatment
might drop more steeply if the alternatives are not presented to
the patient at random. Take, for example, an internet search
engine. When you enter a search query, while there might be a
very large set of results, they are not presented randomly, but
rather, ordered according to relevance by an automatic
algorithm.70 Knowing that the results are presented in order of
relevance, the searcher is enabled to check only the first few
options, while remaining fairly certain that the rest of the
results are not more relevant.
In practice, physicians act similarly to a search engine;
they offer patients first what they believe to be the best
alternative, followed by the second-best option, and so forth. We
can reasonably assume that patients’ preferences are usually
aligned with what physicians believe to be the best options for
them. If physicians order the alternatives according to the
objective risk and benefit that they entail, or according to the
68 In economic terms, the marginal utility of each alternative is equal to the
probability that it will be chosen times the difference between the utility the choice
maker would derive from that alternative and the utility she would derive from her
second-best alternative. Assuming that alternatives are presented at random, the
#
probability of choosing a specific alternative out of 𝑛 alternatives is . Since the chance

of choosing an additional alternative (𝑛 + 1) is

#

$

, the probability of randomly choosing

$!#

a specific alternative strictly decreases. Furthermore, the marginal benefit from having
one more alternative to choose from equals the chances that the new alternative will be
chosen times the difference between the expected utility from that alternative and the
second-best alternative. Since the utility from the second-best alternative grows as the
number of alternatives increases, this difference between utilities decreases. For a
detailed explanation of this model, see George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information¸
69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 214–16 (1961).
69 Although it might generate other costs and benefits.
70 In fact, having a good sorting algorithm is what makes one search engine
preferable to others. See, e.g., Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition
with Network Externalities, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 73, 75, 77, 97 (2012) (explaining that
to attract users, a search engine must succeed in offering them the most relevant results).
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popularity of each treatment with previous patients in a similar
medical condition, most patients are likely to choose one of the
first treatments offered to them.71 No matter what method
physicians use to order treatments, it is clear that alternatives
are not presented at random, and thus the chances that the
patient would miss the alternative that is best for him or her if
he or she is not offered an extra alternative are remote.72 This
might not be the case, however, if the patient has idiosyncratic
preferences. In the latter case, the fact that most patients would
choose a certain course of treatment would be a weaker indication
as to what this specific patient would choose.
3. The Expressive Function of Choice
The third and last benefit of choice making we discuss here
refers to the positive effects of the expressive function of choices.
Choice making consists of two possible expressive functions:73
First, people generally value the opportunity to express their
views to others;74 and second, people generally make choices that
reinforce their sense of self-determination.75 In this sense,
choosing may be perceived as an opportunity for people to
71 The assumption is that if an alternative is popular within a certain group,
other members of that group are likely to choose it in the future. This assumption is
quite intuitive and is commonly used to predict an individual’s preferences, for example,
it is applied by internet search engines. See id. at 79. A more sophisticated method would
be to personalize the order of the alternatives according to the patient’s private
preferences; for example, the alternatives could be ordered by their popularity among
people who share similar characteristics (e.g., gender, age, etc.) with the particular
patient. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and
Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1471–76 (2014) (proposing that
contract default rules should be personalized according to people’s unique preferences.
Porat and Strahilevitz’s suggestion extends even further than considering age and
gender: big data should be used to uncover people’s actual preferences, and the default
terms of the agreements set accordingly.).
72 This is only true if we assume that physicians do not make mistakes
regarding what is the best (objective) treatment. When physicians recommend a
treatment that is ill-suited to the patient’s condition, however, they are subject to
liability under negligence law, for advising the patient to take the wrong treatment. As
negligence law may already assign liability in such a case, we need not consider it when
we evaluate the doctrine of informed consent. See Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d 1155, 1164
(Pa. 2015) (holding that when the alleged cause of action is negligence with respect to
the physician’s recommendation of treatment, evidence that a patient affirmatively
consented to treatment are generally irrelevant).
73 We refer to this benefit as the “expressive value” of a choice, but one can think
of it also as the opportunity for “self-determination” through making choices.
74 Empirical studies support the idea that people derive utility from passing
information about themselves to others through making choices. See infra notes 75, 77.
75 For a psychological account of the role of self-determination in decision
making, see Alan S. Waterman et al., Predicting the Subjective Experience of Intrinsic
Motivation: The Role of Self-Determination, the Balance of Challenges and Skills, and
Self-Realization Values, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1447, 1453–57 (2003)
(showing that self-determination motivates people when making choices).
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vindicate the importance of their beliefs to themselves. To
illustrate the positive effect of expressiveness to a choice maker,
consider the following example:
Example 3. Religious beliefs. Sarah, who is extremely religious,
consults with Robert, a genetics expert, about the chances that her
unborn child would suffer from a genetic disorder. Robert discovers a
genetic anomaly in Sarah’s blood test, which is likely to manifest as a
severe physical disorder. Normally, Robert would offer his patients to
abort the pregnancy in these circumstances. Knowing that religious
women as Sarah, however, do not usually choose the option of abortion
in such cases, Robert decides to tell Sarah about the test results, but
he does not inform her of the option of having an abortion as a possible
alternative to consider, given the situation.76

There is a strong intuition that Robert did something
wrong. Moreover, this intuition persists even when assuming that
Robert was right, and that indeed, Sarah would not have chosen
to abort the pregnancy even had she been informed of the option
of doing so. There is a feeling that Sarah lost something as a result
of Robert’s behavior of not telling her about the alternative of
abortion. But what is it that she lost? We suggest that Robert’s
behavior robbed Sarah of the benefit derived from making the
choice not to abort the unborn child, which conforms with her
religious beliefs. That is, she was robbed off her opportunity to
express to herself, and maybe even to others, that she “did the
right thing” (according to her view).
Indeed, the expressive function of choice often pertains to
how others perceive us through our choices.77 Studies have shown
that the desire to express oneself might cause people to choose an
alternative merely for its expressive function.78 This tendency
implies that having more alternatives to choose from is desirable
to some people as it increases their options to use choice as a tool
for expressing themselves to others.
Notably, the benefit generated from the expressiveness of
choice arises at the stage that the choice is actually made.
76 The example is based on an Israeli case. File No. 3198/01, District Court of
Civil Appeals (Jer.), Ploni v. City of Jerusalem (May 12, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.)
77 Heejung S. Kim & David K. Sherman, “Express Yourself”: Culture and the
Effect of Self-Expression on Choice, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 2, 9 (2007)
(demonstrating through experiments the effects that expression has on choices).
78 Studies found that people may select a particular alternative simply for the
sake of choosing something different from the rest. Dan Ariely & Jonathan Levav,
Sequential Choice in Group Settings: Taking the Road Less Traveled and Less Enjoyed, 27
J. CONSUMER RES. 279, 288 (2000) (showing that individuals seek variety when making a
decision within groups, and that the variety-seeking tendency is explained by a desire for
self-presentation); Heejung S. Kim & Aimee Drolet, Choice and Self-Expression: A Cultural
Analysis of Variety-Seeking, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 373–75 (2003)
(showing that people who value self-expression present a variety-seeking tendency).
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Therefore, the expressive value of choice is independent of the ex
post outcome of that choice. Accordingly, even if we are certain that
if Robert had offered Sarah the alternative of abortion, the outcome
of her choice would have been the same, Sarah still lost from being
deprived of actually making this choice. She lost the opportunity
both to vindicate her beliefs to herself and to express herself to
others through making her choice not to abort the unborn child.
***
To conclude, patients derive different types of benefits
from being offered several alternative treatments to their
ailment—it enhances their sense of control over their life, allows
them to choose the treatment that confirms best with their
desires, and offers them a way to express themselves through
the making of that choice.
B.

The Costs of Choice

Having outlined the benefits of choosing an alternative out
of a growing list of alternatives, we now turn to analyze the costs
that such a choice entails; namely, the costs associated with
acquiring information about the different alternatives, and
thereafter the costs of weighing these alternatives against each
other; the cost of the increased probability of making a mistake; the
cost of anticipated regret that patients incur when they stress over
the possibility that they will regret their choice in the future; and the
cost of experienced regret resulting from people’s tendency to keep
thinking about the repudiated alternatives—and in particular,
about the possibility that one of these other options would have
made them more satisfied than the selected alternative.
This section outlines these negative effects of making
choices and demonstrates their manifestation in the context of
informed consent. We find two of the costs to be especially
detrimental to patients’ well-being: the costs of increased
probability of mistake and the costs of regret. We argue that these
two types of costs are substantial for patients, since they markedly
circumvent the two prominent benefits that patients derive from
having more alternatives to choose from. Particularly, the cost of
making the wrong choice of treatment manifests a counter effect to
the benefit that patients gain from the increase in chances that
they would choose the best treatment for themselves.79 The costs of
anticipated regret and experienced regret negate the effect of

79

See infra Section II.B.4.
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choice on the patient’s sense of control,80 as neither the costs nor
the benefits depend on the patient’s ultimate choice of treatment
or its outcome. Even though these costs exist whenever a patient is
faced with a choice of treatment, courts have largely looked over
them when applying the informed consent doctrine.
We start our analysis of the costs associated with making
choices with the added information that the patient needs to
acquire for every additional alternative treatment.
1. Information Costs
In choosing between several alternatives, rational people
will always try to identify the alternative that best accords with
their preferences. To do so, they must first gather information
about each of the alternatives. This process of collecting the
relevant information incurs costs. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the expected costs of collecting information per one
alternative do not vary dramatically with the number of relevant
alternatives, so that patients invest a similar amount of resources
to gather information regarding a given alternative regardless of
whether it is the first alternative presented to them or the last.81
As the costs of acquiring information for each alternative
treatment are (approximately) fixed, and the benefit the patient
entails from additional alternatives steadily decreases,82
information costs alone would lead a rational patient to prefer
that the number of alternatives to choose from be limited.83 In
other words, rational patients may continue looking for a suitable
See infra Sections II.B.2, II.B.5 (respectively).
The investment may vary between different alternatives, but since the cost is
unknown to the patient ex ante, she can only consider the expected cost of information.
Note that the information about one of the alternatives may possibly expose some of the
information about another. In such situations, the marginal cost of gathering information
decreases, and the optimal number of alternatives increases.
82 The marginal utility from the benefit of choice decreases. This understanding
follows the rich literature regarding the economics of information. The general
understanding in economics is that a choice maker should invest in gathering information
to the point that the marginal investment in gathering information is equal to the marginal
expected benefit that the additional information creates. See supra notes 61, 68–69 and
accompanying text; see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of
Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1441, 1443 (2000).
83 Acquiring information about each alternative is not necessarily a binary
choice (acquire information or not), but a continuum (invest X in acquiring information).
Adding more alternatives might induce the agent to invest less in acquiring information
about each alternative and not necessarily reduce the total number of alternatives.
However, whenever a person decides to invest less in acquiring information, he or she
reduces the chance that the alternative he or she ultimately chooses will be the best
option available. We can regard the cost of acquiring information as the optimal cost,
given that tradeoff. For further analysis of the risk of making an error due to the costs
of information, see infra Section II.B.4.
80

81
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treatment when they are presented with more alternatives to
choose from, but since they must acquire information for each new
alternative, they will continue to consider additional alternatives
only until it ceases to be efficient to do so. At this point, rational
patients will simply ignore additional alternative treatments,
even if they are presented to them.84 Consequently, given the
assumption of rationality, the costs of information alone would
never lead to a net loss (harm) to a rational patient.85
The assumption, however, that patients are rational and
can accurately decide whether they should consider another
treatment does not always hold. People may keep examining new
alternatives even when such a practice is too costly for them.86
Examining more alternatives provides the choice maker with
information not only about the particular alternatives being
considered, but also about the entire realm of alternatives that
should be considered to make an optimal choice. Therefore, choice
makers often wonder when they should stop looking for more
alternatives and make a choice.
Psychologists have identified choice “satisficing” and
“maximizing” as two strategies people generally employ to
contend with this question.87 Under the satisficing strategy, the
84 When alternatives are presented to the choice maker at random, and
sequentially, the person may worry that the next option may be better than all previous
ones. In such cases, the cost of acquiring information about new alternatives includes the
opportunity cost associated with the time spent waiting for the new alternative to appear.
Romantic dating presents such a problem: the agent may be unaware of the quality of
potential romantic partners. Dating allows both partners to acquire information about the
other and to learn about their own “rank” in the dating world. Every time the agent decides
to wait and keep dating instead of settling down with her current partner, however, she
has less time to spend with her ultimate choice. For a mathematical proof and further
discussion, see generally HANNAH FRY, THE MATHEMATICS OF LOVE: PATTERNS, PROOFS,
AND THE SEARCH FOR THE ULTIMATE EQUATION (2015).
85 Interestingly, this analysis may be used to manipulate the alternative that
the choice maker eventually chooses, without limiting the number of alternatives from
her perspective. This form of manipulation is not necessarily negative. As Thaler and
Sunstein show, a benevolent “choice architect” can use this limitation to “nudge” people
toward the right decision, without limiting their choice. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
11–13 (2008). Consider, for example, an internet search engine. By constructing the
order in which the results appear before the choice maker, the engine can impact the
alternative that people ultimately choose without physically limiting the number of
alternatives. See, e.g., Argenton & Prüfer, supra note 70, at 82.
86 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 80–86 (arguing that people may
irrationally overinvest in gathering information about additional alternatives out of fear
of losing a better option).
87 See id., at 77–85 (describing these two strategies). Herbert Simon was the
first to identify the two strategies. See Herbert Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure
of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 129–30 (1956) (arguing that people, as well
as other organisms in nature, often stop looking for more alternatives after identifying
an alternative that is “good enough,” thus contradicting the rational choice theory model.
Simon named the two models accordingly).
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choice maker sets a threshold for each relevant factor and picks
the first alternative that meets these thresholds.88 Satisficing is
a rational strategy, as it takes into account the costs of gathering
information.89 Some people, however, apply a choice-maximizing
strategy rather than a satisficing one. Choice maximizers gather
information about different alternatives until they find the best
one, even if the investment in acquiring the information is not
expected to yield enough benefit to justify the cost.90 Offering
people with such a tendency too many alternatives can therefore
be detrimental to their well-being.91
In the medical context, in some situations the number of
alternative treatments can be large. To comply with their duty of
informed consent, physicians are required to offer their patients
information about all the alternative treatments available for their
medical condition. Some of these patients are choice maximizers.
These patients might invest a lot of time and effort in searching for
information about each treatment, even when it becomes too costly
for them to do so. In addition, since timing might be a critical factor
for the success of any treatment, investing too much time in
acquiring information about the different alternative treatments
might also negatively affect the patient’s chances of recovery.
2. The Costs of Anticipated Regret
People tend to agonize over difficult choices and in
particular, continue thinking about the alternatives they did not
choose, wondering whether one of them would have been a better
choice. Accordingly, when facing several appealing alternatives,
they often engage in an internal debate (and sometimes an
88 Alternatively, a choice maker may assign one threshold for a combination of
factors—if the choice maker ascribes a certain value to each factor, a possible satisficing
strategy would be to pick the first choice that crosses a certain aggregate score,
considering all factors. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 78.
89 See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 89–90 (arguing that “maximizers” are
not really maximizing wellbeing, as they do not factor in “the costs . . . of gathering and
assessing information”). See generally Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational
Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955) (arguing that given the costs of acquiring information
and possessing it, a satisficing strategy is rational, in the sense that it maximizes the
net expected utility from choice and the costs of making it).
90 We can place satisfiers and choice maximizers at two ends of a scale. Most
people employ a combination of both strategies, whilst very few people are at the very
end of the scale, for every decision. See Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus
Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178,
1181–83 (2002) (showing empirically that people can be placed on a “Maximization Scale”
that measures their propensity to adopt a maximizing strategy).
91 Notably, information costs can vary across individuals. The experience a
choice maker has amassed over time could reduce her costs of acquiring information about
certain alternatives; moreover, some choice makers may also become more skilled at
collecting relevant information.
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external dialogue with others) regarding the possibility that an
option other than what they ultimately choose will emerge at a
later stage as the preferable option for them. Psychologists call
this phenomenon “anticipated regret,”92 referring to the stress a
person experiences over the possibility that he or she will regret
his or her choice in the future (as opposed to “experienced regret,”
which as we later discuss, describes a negative feeling a person
experiences after making his or her choice, when considering the
rejected alternatives).93
The magnitude of anticipated regret is a function of the
number of alternatives available to choose from. When other
factors are neutralized, the more alternatives we have, the more
anxious we tend to feel about the choice we are about to make.94
Psychologists have suggested several explanations for this
phenomenon. First, the more alternatives there are to choose from,
the greater the probability that one of the rejected alternatives
could have been the best choice.95 Second, choosing from a large set
of alternatives forces the choice maker to imagine a large number
of counterfactuals and, therefore, more possibilities of later
regretting his or her choice.96 Third, some psychologists have
suggested that complex choices force the choice maker to assess
and compare several attributes for every alternative. Thus, several
alternatives might be found to be better than the others—each on
the basis of different attributes. This finding may intensify the
choice maker’s anxiety that he or she will regret the choice later
92 See, e.g., Marcel Zeelenberg, Anticipated Regret, Expected Feedback and
Behavioral Decision Making, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 93, 94 (1999). People may also
experience a contrastive sense of “anticipated elation,” generated from imagining a positive
outcome of their choices (such as imagining winning when betting on a horse). See Jeremy
J. Sierra & Michael R. Hyman, In Search of Value: A Model of Wagering Intentions, 17 J.
MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 235, 240 (2009). However, researchers found that the positive
influence of anticipated elation has a very modest effect on people compered to its negative
counterpart, anticipated regret. See, e.g., Joop van der Pligt et al., Affect, Attitudes and
Decisions: Let’s Be More Specific, 8 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 33, 59 (1998).
93 See infra Section II.B.5.
94 See Christopher J. Anderson, The Psychology of Doing Nothing: Forms of
Decision Avoidance Result from Reason and Emotion, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 139, 140–42,
144–46 (2003) (arguing that the feeling of anticipated regret intensifies with the number
of alternatives); Adi Sagi & Nehemia Friedland, The Cost of Richness: The Effects of the
Size and Diversity of Decision Sets on Post-Decision Regret, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 515, 523 (2007) (discussing the relation between the number of alternatives
and the choice maker’s sense of regret).
95 See Anderson, supra note 94, at 144; David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making
Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961, 961, 969 (1982) (discussing the correlation
between the fear of regret and the increase of uncertainty as the number of alternatives to
choose from grows); Janet Landman, Regret: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 17 J.
THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 135, 153–54 (1987) (arguing that as the number of alternatives to
choose from rises, so does the choice maker’s fear of making the wrong choice).
96 See, e.g., Landman, supra note 95, at 154 (arguing that regret is a result of thinking
about “possible selves,” so as the number of possible selves increases so does the feeling of regret).

396

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:2

on.97 Regardless of the reason or combination of reasons for this
effect, we can conclude that a greater number of alternatives to
choose from increases the magnitude of anticipated regret, which
constitutes a cost for the choice maker.
Notably, the weight of anticipated regret is greater when
the choice is more significant to the choice maker, for the fear of
choosing the wrong alternative is greater when the ramifications
of a wrong choice might be severe. Thus, the effect of anticipated
regret might be especially pertinent regarding medical treatments.
For example, consider a patient who has a specific type of cancer,
and must choose between two alternatives: surgery and
chemotherapy treatment. This patient is given the information
that the surgery carries a risk of complications and death, while
the chemotherapy treatment carries a lower risk of death but
causes physical suffering for the duration of the treatment. The
mere choice between these two courses of treatments might be
agonizing, particularly if the patient fears that he or she might
regret the choice later on. This negative feeling is what we describe
here as the cost of anticipated regret.
3. The Costs of the Decision-Making Process
After acquiring information about the different alternative
treatments, the patient reaches the point of having to choose the
treatment. At this stage, the patient must weigh all the
information and reach a decision. Psychological studies have
shown that difficult mental endeavors might be mentally draining
for people.98 Moreover, the process of choosing might require
physical effort as well.99 When required to make a difficult choice,
a person’s pupils dilate, their heart rate increases, and their bloodsugar level drops.100 Hence, making choices can be mentally and
97 SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 152–54 (arguing that the feeling of regret is
created by “counterfactual thinking”; therefore, anticipated regret worsens as the
number of possible counterfactuals it entails increases).
98 Evidently, people might reach the point of exhaustion after taxing mental
endeavors, such as solving difficult mathematical problems. See Roy F. Baumeister et al.,
Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1252, 1252, 1263–64 (1998) (proving that resisting temptation, making a responsible
choice, and solving difficult problems all draw from a shared resource pool, wherefore choice
makers are easily tempted and have a tendency to become more passive).
99 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND EFFORT 4–16 (1973) (stating
that mental processes entail effort and suggesting several factors that influence the
amount of effort needed).
100 The physical effects of mental tasks have been thoroughly documented. See,
e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Pupillary, Heart Rate, and Skin Resistance Changes
During a Mental Task, 79 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 164, 164–66 (1969) (indicating
several physical effects of mental effort and showing that these effects increase with
effort); L.J.M. Mulder et al., Respiratory Pattern, Invested Effort, and Variability in
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physically taxing, and the more complex a decision, the more
resources the patient must invest to make it.101 A patient facing a
decision about a medical treatment—a decision that might have
considerable implications for his or her life—may thus experience
significant mental (and even physical) negative effects.
4. Increased Probability of Mistake
As explained above, one of the benefits of having more
alternatives to choose from imputes to the increased chance that
patients would be offered the best alternative treatment for
them.102 This benefit depends on the patient making the right
choice. In practice, however, patients might choose a treatment
that is less suited to their set of preferences in comparison to the
other alternatives considered; i.e., they may make a mistake.
There are two main reasons for this mistake: first, patients
might have insufficient information regarding all the available
alternative treatments; and second, patients might have
insufficient mental or emotional resources to make the decision.
Regarding the former cause for mistake, when a patient is
gathering information about alternative treatments, he or she
may at some point stop exploring additional options because the
information-gathering costs have become too high relative to the
benefit derived from considering additional treatments. Since
there is a chance, however, that one of the unexplored
alternatives would comprise the optimal treatment, the cost of
collecting information creates a risk of making a mistake.
Moreover, when patients face a significant number of treatments
to choose from, especially if they have limited time to make their
choice, they might (very reasonably) gather less information
regarding each treatment. If patients acquire limited information
concerning the available alternatives, they must base their
decision on incomplete information. Such a situation can lead
patients to err and choose an alternative that they would not have
opted for had they been in possession of complete information.

Heart Rate and Blood Pressure During the Performance of Mental Tasks, in COMPUTER
ANALYSIS OF CARDIOVASCULAR SIGNALS 219–34 (M. Di Rienzo et al. eds., 1995) (showing
an increase in both the heart rate and blood pressure of research subjects throughout
the course of a mental effort).
101 As mental resources are limited, performing one task may affect our ability to
perform other tasks. See Marcel Adam Just & Patricia A. Carpenter, A Capacity Theory of
Comprehension: Individual Differences in Working Memory, 99 PSYCHOL. REV. 122, 122–
24 (1992) (showing that the mental effort of language comprehension is determined by both
the need to store information and processes that enable language comprehension).
102 See supra Section II.A.2.
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Since the information gap widens as the number of alternatives
grows, having more alternatives increases the risk of error.
The second prominent reason for patients selecting a
wrong choice of treatment concerns their inadequate mental (or
emotional) resources needed to make such a decision. As
explained above, the more complex a decision, the more mental
resources people must invest in making it.103 At a certain point,
they might reach the limits of those resources.104 Psychological
studies have found that people who reach the limit of their
resources might suffer from “ego-depletion.”105 When a person
suffers from ego-depletion, he or she tends to base choices on
whims and short-term desires rather than on long-term
preferences,106 and is thus more susceptible to making wrong
decisions. To illustrate, say that in order to eat a satisfying
breakfast and get to work by 8 a.m., I must get out of bed by 7
a.m. When my alarm clock goes off at 7 a.m., however, I might feel
like I need ten more minutes of sleep and hit the snooze button. I
may do so even though I am well aware of the fact that more often
than not, I regret this decision later on—either because I did not
have enough time to eat breakfast as I wanted to or because I was
late to work. My decision to hit the snooze button results from the
sense of tiredness I experience when the alarm clock goes off. It
thus serves my short-term desire to sleep at the expense of my
long-term preferences that are more important to me. Studies
have found that any activity that requires the use of mental
resources can leave us with insufficient mental resources to make
a good decision;107 that is, to choose the alternative that is in
greatest compliance with our set of preferences. As the problem of
ego-depletion worsens when the choice is harder to make, there is
103 The physical effort associated with the process of making a choice is
identified separately as the “cost of decision making.” See supra notes 100–101 and
accompanying text.
104 We focus on cases in which the number of alternatives and their complexity
influence the probability that the choice maker will make a mistake. However, some
cognitive biases, such as optimism, might also cause people to make mistakes, regardless
of the number of alternatives that they face. These psychological phenomena might justify
intervention in personal autonomy in ways we do not discuss here. For further discussion
on such psychological and social phenomena, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 452 (suggesting “soft” intervention in people’s choice when such phenomena occur).
105 “Ego-depletion” is a common term for a failure of self-regulation due to
insufficient strength to override feelings or impulses. For an overview of early literature on
the subject, see Baumeister et al., supra note 98, at 1263; see also Roy F. Baumeister & Todd
F. Heatherton, Self-Regulation Failure: An Overview, 7 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1, 2–4 (1996).
106 For a meta-analysis of eighty-three different studies that examined egodepletion, see Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of SelfControl: A Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 495, 515 (2010) (finding a strong relation
between ego-depletion and physical symptoms like blood glucose levels, among others).
107 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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a greater probability that patients who are facing a choice of
medical treatments—a decision that may have significant impact
on their life—will compromise their long-term preferences to
satisfy their short-term desires.
The ramifications of ego-depletion might be dire,
especially when the best alternative available to the patient in
the long term is very uncomfortable in the short run. For
example, in many situations, patients are offered several
treatments, all of which will create discomfort. In such a case,
patients might procrastinate, effectively choosing not to treat
their ailment for the time being, just to avoid discomfort, even if
they know that they will regret doing so later on.
Note that the likelihood that ego-depletion will manifest is
a function not only of the “cost” of the decision at hand but also of
the patient’s past decisions. When a person is required to make
consecutive choices, each choice consumes a certain part of his or
her available resources, until at some point, the patient becomes
more susceptible to making mistakes.108 Accordingly, some
patients, especially those who suffer from a chronic illness that
requires continuous management in several ways, need to make
multiple choices regarding their treatment, and are thus exposed
to an increased probability of making a mistake. Since having more
alternatives to choose from (regarding each separate decision)
increases the need for mental resources, when patients are offered
more alternatives, they become more susceptible to ego-depletion
with regard to both their immediate choice and future choices.
5. The Costs of Experienced Regret
Several studies have shown that the more alternatives
people have to choose from, the less content they tend to be with
the alternative they ultimately choose.109 As opposed to the sense
108 A famous study of Israeli parole board hearings demonstrates how making
several successive decisions may cause ego-depletion. The study showed that at the
beginning of the day as well as after having lunch, the probability that the parole board
will grant a petition for early parole was higher than right before lunch. When the judges
are well rested, they have the required resources to make rational choices. As their level
of resources decreases, judges tend to choose the default (in this context, the default was
rejecting the petition). The costs of making decisions early in the day may have caused
the judges to reach potentially wrong decisions later on. See Shai Danziger et al.,
Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6890 (2011).
But see Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Response, Overlooked Factors in the
Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. E833, E833 (2011)
(criticizing the results of the former study); Shai Danziger et al., Response, Reply to
Weinshall-Margel and Shapard: Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions Persist, 108
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E834, E834 (2011) (responding to that critique).
109 See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 86–87 (stating that choice-maximizers
who seek more alternatives to choose from score high on a “Regret Scale,” meaning that
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of anticipated regret discussed earlier, experienced regret is an ex
post sense of regret attributed to the negative feeling choice makers
may experience from not choosing the alternatives they rejected in
making their choice. Since people are not always rational, choice
makers in general tend to dwell on the alternatives that they
rejected and the possibility that one of these alternatives would
have made them more satisfied. This sense of regret intensifies as
the number of alternatives available rises.110
Moreover, this type of regret is greater when the
comparison between the relevant alternatives is more complex.
When we compare between alternatives, we make trade-offs
between different factors. The more relevant factors there are
for a person to consider, the stronger the sense of regret may be
once that person makes his or her choice, for he or she has more
reasons to regret that choice.111
For example, patients may have to choose from several
possible treatments when each treatment has a different possible
side effect. Once patients choose a treatment and suffer from its
side effects, they may regret their choice of treatment, thinking
they would have felt better had they chosen one of the different
treatments they considered. This regret might even have a more
detrimental effect on their overall well-being than do the side
effects they suffer.112
***
The following matrix summarizes the benefits and costs
associated with having more alternative treatments to choose from.
When depriving a patient of information about the alternative
treatments for her medical condition, a physician robs the patient
of the positive effects related to making the choice of treatment. At
the same time, this deprivation of information from the patient
diminishes the negative effects associated with making this choice.
As the declared purpose of the doctrine of informed consent is to
they enjoy their choice less); Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is
Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 995, 1002–04 (2000) (showing that participants who tasted chocolates from a
wide array were significantly less satisfied with the chocolates they tried than
participants who tasted chocolates from a small array).
110 See Sagi & Friedland, supra note 94, at 517–21 (showing that the postdecision regret gets stronger with the number of alternatives). Another factor that may
influence the intensity of regret is the extent to which a person is familiar with the
considered alternatives. The less familiar a person is with the alternatives at hand, the
higher the chances are that he or she will regret not choosing them.
111 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 117–23.
112 Notably, some psychologists assert that when people make a choice that is
later found to be satisfactory, they experience a sense of elation from knowing that they
made the right choice. However, studies have shown that the positive feeling of elation
is not as strong as the negative feeling of regret. See supra note 92.
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defend patients’ right to choose, we must consider both these
benefits and these costs in full when applying the doctrine—and
not just the positive effects of more disclosure on patient’s bodily
integrity, as courts currently do. Our suggestions as to the
implications of appropriately ingraining the costs and benefits of
making choices within the doctrine of informed consent are the
purpose of the next and last Part. As the matrix describes, some
positive and negative effects of making choices extend beyond one
segment on the choice-making process timeline. For instance, a
person may experience a sense of control merely from being in the
position to consider several alternative paths to choose from. The
choice maker may then continue to experience a sense of control
when processing the information regarding these alternatives,
considering the potential of each of them to fit his or her goals and
needs. This sense of control may last (and even intensify) until the
moment at which the choice is made; i.e., when the sense of control
is being realized through making the actual choice. By contrast, the
benefit attained from finding the best alternative refers to the
utility that the patient draws from selecting the treatment that is
most consistent with his or her set of preferences. Therefore, we
specifically located this benefit in the third segment, whose
starting point is the act of choosing. A similar presentation can be
drawn, mutatis mutandis, from the matrix presentation of the
negative effects associated with having additional treatments to
choose from. For instance, the costs patients incur from the sense
of regret may continue to affect them throughout the choicemaking timeline. After the choice is made, however, the correct
classification of these costs does not involve anticipated regret (i.e.,
the fear of regretting the choice in the future), but rather
experienced regret (i.e., the actual feeling of regret, manifested in
wondering whether one or more of the repudiated alternatives
would have comprised a better choice).
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III.

RESHAPING THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

Thus far, we have presented the features of the doctrine of
informed consent as currently applied by courts, alongside our
analysis of the benefits and costs that the process of choice
making entails for patients’ well-being. Armed with these
insights, this third and last Part of the article discusses the
necessary changes that must be embedded within the doctrine, so
that its implementation will protect appropriately the right of
patients to informed choice, while taking into account the effects
that this choice has on their well-being.
A.

Setting a New Standard

The goal of tort law is to protect people’s physical,
emotional, and economic well-being from wrongful interference.113
The principle maintained by the doctrine of informed consent,
however, is different. Tort law has recognized the right to make an
informed choice as a manifestation of the idea of personal
autonomy.114 Thus, the doctrine of informed consent is designed to
safeguard the patient’s autonomy by defining situations in which
depriving a person’s right to make an informed choice constitutes
a wrong.115 Accordingly, the doctrine requires physicians to inform
patients of all the possible treatments to their medical condition.
The premise underlying this requirement is that as an expression
of personal autonomy, the act of choosing is perceived as a good in
itself; therefore, such an act can only benefit patients. According to
this reasoning, having more alternative treatments to choose from
is necessarily better for patients than having less. As we explained
in the previous Part, however, this presumption is misguided.116
Thus, we must set a new standard for disclosure—one that takes
into account both the benefits and the costs of making choices.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (2000).
See, e.g., id. §§ 1, 95 (including autonomy within the list of interests
protected by the law, Dobbs indicates that autonomy is “the centerpiece of the law on
intentional torts and to some extent other torts as well”); see also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (observing that “choices central to
personal . . . autonomy are [also] central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Morris v. Brandenburg, 356 P.3d 564, 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (noting
that “the medical concept of dying with autonomy” should be weighed against additional
“societal principles such as preventing a person from taking the life of
another; . . . promoting the integrity, healing, and life-preserving principles of the
medical profession,” and others), aff ’ d 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016); Peter H. Schuck,
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994) (indicating that “[t]he
autonomy principle is deeply entrenched in our . . . law”).
115 See In re Michael L., 809 N.Y.S.2d 194, 194-95 (App. Div. 2006) (indicating
informed consent as a “fundamental common-law right”).
116 See supra Section II.B.
113

114
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The following variation to Example 1 illustrates how the
standard of disclosure should be set to protect a patient’s well-being:
Example 1.2. Alternate procedures. John is diagnosed with a serious
illness for which there are three possible treatments. All these
treatments entail a similar chance to cure John’s disease. They differ
in the following aspects: Treatment A causes side effects of nausea
and vomiting, but poses no long-term risk; Treatment B entails
possible complications that put John at risk of permanent damage to
his arm; Treatment C carries a very small risk of permanent
neurological harm. Neither Treatment B nor C involves any shortterm side effects.
How many alternatives should Mary, John’s physician, present to him?

The focus of this article is on the duty of informed consent, and not
the duty to provide adequate treatment. To distill our analysis of
informed consent, we assume that Mary followed her duty of care
by offering a proper treatment to John. Accordingly, if Mary
presented John only with some of the alternative treatments, we
assume that the treatments that she presented to John are those
objectively considered most appropriate for his ailment, and as
such, reflect the preferences of most patients in John’s condition.117
Having distinguished between the duty to provide
reasonable treatment and the duty of informed consent, we now
turn to examine how the standard of disclosure should be
117 Physicians have a duty of care toward their patients. The standard of care
is generally determined by the Learned Hand rule. According to this rule, first
articulated in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., by Judge Learned Hand, liability in
negligence should be determined based on the relation between investment in precaution
(B) and the product of the probability (P) and magnitude (L) of harm resulting from the
accident. If PL exceeds B, then the defendant should be liable. By contrast, if B equals
or exceeds PL, then the defendant should not be held liable. See United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1947). The formula was later endorsed by
courts as well as the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., 2010) (suggesting a risk-benefit balancing
test to asset negligence, substantially similar to learned hand formula, whereby the
benefit is the advantage that the defendant gains if he or she refrains from taking
precautions. When the costs of precautions exceed this benefit the defendant should be
held liable in negligence). Sometimes, however, it is very difficult to determine which
treatment should be the standard under the Hand rule. Several jurisdictions have
adopted the “error in judgment” rule, whereby the physician is not considered negligent
if she chose, in good faith, one of several treatments that are considered proper for the
illness at hand. For jurisdictions that have adopted the error in judgment rule, see, e.g.,
DiFranco v. Klein, 657 A.2d 145,148 (R.I. 1995) (“[A]s long as a physician exercises the
applicable degree of care, he or she may choose between differing but accepted methods
of treatment and not be held liable”); Ezell v. Hutson, 20 P.3d 975, 976–78 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001) (the Washington Court of Appeals stated that the “error of judgment”
instruction is proper). For jurisdictions that rejected the rule, see, e.g., Hirahara v.
Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834 (Haw. 1998); Rogers v. Meridian Park Hosp., 772 P.2d 929,
931–33 (Or. 1989) (en banc) (the Oregon Supreme Court decided that a physician might
be negligent while still making a mistake in good faith.); Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d
510, 516, 527 (S.D. 2007) (the Supreme Court of South Dakota decided that jurors should
no longer be instructed that physicians are not liable for good-faith errors).
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designed. This examination allows us to determine the number of
alternatives that Mary, the physician in Example 1.2, should
present to John in order to comply with her duty of informed
consent. We maintain that the answer to this question should
derive from the cost-benefit analysis presented in the previous
part.118 Accordingly, we contend below that the scope of Mary’s
duty of disclosure toward John depends on both the positive and
negative effects that the process of choice making entails for John.
Example 1.2 illustrates two main benefits that John
could have from choosing his treatment—enhancing John’s sense
of control, and allowing him to choose the best alternative. First,
John’s involvement in choosing his treatment could advance his
sense of control over his life, and specifically over the course of
his treatment. As we explained, this feeling can be considered as
a benefit on its own, but more importantly, it might also increase
John’s chances of recovery.119 However, the effect of John’s sense
of control over his recovery depends on whether he needs to take
an active role in his treatment.120 If, for example, Treatments B
and C are surgical procedures, John’s role in them is fairly
limited. Accordingly, the effect that the increase in his sense of
control might have on his long-term recovery is limited as well.
By contrast, if treatment A requires John to participate actively
in the medicinal treatment, then John’s involvement in the
choice of treatment might prove to be very beneficial in the long
run, as it increases not only his sense of control but also his
chances of recovery.
Having assumed that Mary provided John with proper
care, if Mary revealed to John only one (or two) of the alternative
treatments, it would be the alternative that most patients in
John’s condition would have preferred. If John has idiosyncratic
preferences that lead him to favor an alternative considered
inferior by most patients, however, informing John of all the
alternatives might be crucial to enable him to choose the best
118 See supra Part II. Considering both the personal and social costs of choice to
the patient aligns with the recent understanding that the risk the injurer imposes on
herself should be taken into account when setting the standard of due care. Robert
Cooter and Ariel Porat first articulated this idea, naming it “self-risk.” See Robert Cooter
& Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? Law and
Economics in Conflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19, 28 (2000); see also ROBERT D. COOTER &
ARIEL PORAT, GETTING INCENTIVES RIGHT: IMPROVING TORTS, CONTRACTS, AND
RESTITUTION, 32–46 (2014); Porat, supra note 47, at 129–33 (arguing that considering
self-risk when setting the standard of care aligns the standard with the liability of the
negligent injurer). The notion that self-risk should influence the standard of due care
was adopted by the third restatement of torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. b (2010).
119 See KATZ, supra note 54.
120 See supra note 54.
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alternative for him.121 To illustrate, in Example 1.2, Treatment
A might be considered objectively superior to Treatments B and
C, as it causes no risk of permanent harm. If John is especially
afraid of having nausea, however, and thus prefers to expose
himself to a risk of complications, he might find Treatments B
or C more suitable to his needs than treatment A. Furthermore,
if John cares about his arm more than the average person (for
example, if John is a baseball pitcher), then he might prefer
Treatment C, which creates a smaller risk of neurological
damage, over Treatment B, even if most patients would have
preferred Treatment B over C. Denying John the information
about Treatment C would deprive him of the benefit associated
with choosing the alternative that suits him best.
Physicians cannot always know ex ante if the patient has
idiosyncratic preferences, and they are not expected to. There is
always some chance that a patient would prefer a treatment
other than the one considered best objectively, and it is that
chance that should be taken into account. Note that the benefit
derived from having more alternative treatments to choose from
depends on the differences between the alternatives. For
instance, if Treatments B and C both create a risk to the
patient’s arm, but the risk created by Treatment B is greater
than the one created by Treatment C, then there is no chance
that any patient (including John) would prefer Treatment B over
Treatment C. In such a case, the benefit of finding the best
alternative from disclosing Treatment B would be zero.122
To set the standard, we must weigh the benefits that John
would gain from choosing his treatment against the costs that this
choice would entail for him. Two main costs are relevant in this
regard: the possibility of making a mistake and the costs of regret.123
Let us assume that since Treatment A poses no risk of
permanent harm, generally John would prefer it over
Treatments B and C. Knowing about all three alternative
treatments, however, forces John to evaluate multiple factors,124
121 See our discussion on the benefit associated with finding the best alternative
supra Section II.A.2.
122 Another benefit of choice making by the patient is the ability of the patient
to express his or her conviction in his or her belief system, to himself or herself and to
others, through choice. This type of benefit is unique and is evident only in cases where
the patient holds special beliefs that might contradict conventional medical practice. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
123 The costs of acquiring information and the mental cost of the process of
deciding are also present, but their main importance is that they increase the probability
of making a mistake.
124 In reality, choosing between treatments is a lot harder than in our simplified
example; treatments differ in their financial costs, chances of success, recovery time, etc.
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making the task of choosing between the alternatives more
difficult, even if there are only three. Faced with this dilemma,
John might suffer from ego-depletion. As we explained above,
ego-depletion causes patients to sacrifice their long-term
genuine preferences for their short-term desires.125 To illustrate,
in Example 1.2, presenting John with all three alternative
treatments increases the risk of mistake, as John might choose
Treatment B or C just to avoid the side effects of Treatment A
(nausea and vomiting). Alternatively, John’s ego-depletion
might result in procrastinating the choice of treatment, which
effectively amounts to choosing not to choose, even at the price
of hindering his chances of recovery.
Furthermore, even if John would choose Treatment A,
which better fits his preferences, when suffering from nausea
and vomiting while knowing he could have avoided this
discomfort by choosing a different treatment, John might regret
his choice. This feeling of regret might affect John’s experience
of the side effects and worsen his suffering.126
Considering both the benefits and costs that the process
of choice making entails for patients, we suggest requiring
physicians to disclose information about additional alternatives,
only insofar as this disclosure is more beneficial than
detrimental for their patient. Accordingly, in Example 1.2,
considering that Treatments B and C are inferior to Treatment
A from his perspective, John might be better off if Mary does not
tell him about Treatment B or C, or both. If John’s benefit from
being told about either of these treatments is small compared to
the costs that this information entails for him, we argue that this
in itself should justify limiting the scope of Mary’s duty of
disclosure toward him.
Courts should objectively consider all the costs and
benefits of disclosure before determining that the physician
breached her duty. Example 1.2 demonstrates circumstances
whereby not only does a physician’s failure to fulfill her duty of
disclosure cause no damage to her patient, but it might actually
promote the patient’s well-being. Under such circumstances, we
contend that John’s physician should not be held liable for
breaching her duty of disclosure.

Furthermore, most forms of treatment involve multiple side effects and possible
complications. To decide, the patient needs to assess all of these factors.
125 See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text.
126 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 152–54 (arguing that the feeling of regret
is created by “counterfactual thinking” and therefore anticipated and experienced regret
worsen as the number of possible counterfactuals it increases).
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When holding a physician liable for breaching their duty, a
plaintiff must still prove that this breach of duty resulted in harm.
The next Section addresses the question of how courts should
consider factual causation, that is, the causal link between the
breach of duty and the subsequent harm, under our theory.
B.

Modifying the Requirement of Factual Causation

To protect patients’ right to informed choice (separately
from their right to receive a proper care), the law must establish
some consequences for physicians’ breach of the duty to disclose,
regardless of whether the patient’s physical harm would have
occurred had the physician informed the patient about alternative
treatment options. In practice, although courts have reaffirmed
their intent to protect patients’ right to informed choice,127 they
persistently demand that plaintiffs preponderantly prove that
had they been fully informed, they would have chosen a different
treatment and subsequently avoided the physical harm.128 As we
explain next, in so doing, they ignore the harm that resulted to
the patient from being deprived of the process of choosing, which
occurs whenever a physician breaches the duty of disclosure.
Interestingly, some common law countries have adopted a
different regime. For example, in both England and Australia, a
patient who is not appropriately informed by his or her physician
may recover damages for physical harm, even if he or she cannot
preponderantly prove that but for the breach of informed consent,
he or she would not have suffered that harm.129 The Israeli
Supreme Court opted for a different solution. Under this court’s
ruling, when a physician breaches the duty of disclosure, if his or
her patient suffers a physical harm but cannot successfully prove
a causal link between the physician’s breach of duty and that harm,
the physician is excused from liability for the patient’s physical
harm but is held liable for “harming the patient’s autonomy.”130 The
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
Some thirty years ago, Marjorie Shultz argued that the law should recognize
patients’ interest in autonomy to distinguish it from their interest in their physical wellbeing. See Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 249–50 (1985).
129 See, e.g., Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [16], [18], [24] (appeal taken
from Eng.) (holding, in the House of Lords, that the patient’s right to an appropriate
warning before surgery is of extreme importance to “ensure that due respect is given to
the [patient’s] autonomy”); Accord Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 (Austl.) (High
Court of Australia adopting the same conclusion).
130 See, e.g., CA 2781/93 Daaka v. Carmel Hosp., Haifa, 53(4) PD (1999) (Isr.)
(the Israeli Supreme Court decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for her
bodily damage for lack of causation, but did allow her to recover for the violation of
autonomy that resulted from not obtaining her informed consent.).
127

128
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amount of damages for such a harm may vary between $15,000 and
$100,000, according to the severity of the physician’s breach.131
We argue that the three alternate regimes—the U.S.
regime, the English and Australian regime, and the Israeli
regime—can be located as three points on a spectrum that
delineates the requirement of factual causation in cases of
informed consent. U.S. law is located on one polar end, in which
protecting the patient’s interest of disclosure is extremely
limited by the requirement of factual causation. On the opposite
end, in England and Australia, patients who were not
appropriately informed about their options of treatments are
entitled to compensation for their entire physical harm, even in
the absence of a causal link between the physician’s breach of
duty and that harm. Lastly, the solution applied by the Israel
Supreme Court lies somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.
On the one hand, the Israeli regime offers some compensation to
a patient for breach of his or her right to informed choice; but on
the other hand, it does not compensate the patient for the
physical harm that cannot be attributed causally to the
physician’s breach of duty toward her.
The solution applied by Israeli Supreme Court is the
closest to what we suggest in this article, as it distinguishes
between the physical harm resulting to the patient from not
realizing his or her right to inform choice, and the harm he or
she suffers as a result of losing the benefit associated with the
act of choosing (which the Israeli Supreme Court identifies as
the damage to the patient’s autonomy).132 Recognizing the
existence of the latter type of harm, the law should acknowledge
two separate losses of benefit from which a patient suffers as a
result of a physicians’ breach of the duty of disclosure. First, this
patient was deprived of the sense of control he or she would have
gained from making an informed choice; and second, the patient
was deprived of the opportunity to choose the best alternative
treatment according to his or her own preferences.133
At present, however, to get any compensation for breach
of informed consent, plaintiffs in the United States are required
to prove that knowing all the relevant alternatives, they would
have opted for another procedure than the one they had agreed
131 See, e.g., CA 1303/09 Kadosh v, Bikur Holim Hosp., at 13–15 (Isr.SC. Feb. 14,
2011) (reviewing the amounts granted by lower courts for harming patients’ autonomy).
132 See supra note 130.
133 We discuss a third possible type of harm that can result from breach of
disclosure in Part II, namely, the harm resulting from preventing the patient from
expressing herself through his or her choice. This type of benefit is substantial in certain
unusual cases, as demonstrated in Example 3. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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to, and that, subsequently, they would have also escaped the
harm resulted from the selected procedure.134 This requirement
ignores the harm resulting to the patient from the loss of sense
of control, which occurs whenever the physician breaches the
duty of disclosure (regardless of the occurrence of any physical
harm). Patients should be compensated for this harm even if it
is plausible that they would have chosen the same treatment
actually performed, and thus would suffer the same physical
harm, had they been given the opportunity to choose.
A second loss of benefit from which a patient suffers
results from being deprived of choosing the best alternative; i.e.,
choosing the treatment that best corresponds to the patient’s own
preferences. Supposedly, this harm is compensated under the
current doctrine of informed consent, as it is expressed by the
requirement that patients establish that had they been presented
with all the reasonable alternatives, they would have chosen a
different treatment than the one actually performed. This
observation, however, is partial. In practice, a patient who was
deprived of informed choice might still be undercompensated for
the loss of not choosing the best alternative. This may occur for
two main reasons. First, subjective preferences are difficult to
prove. Therefore, it is an extremely challenging task for a patient
to preponderantly prove that he or she would have chosen a
different treatment based on his or her idiosyncratic preferences.
Second, in several jurisdictions, the formulation of the butfor test does not allow consideration of a counterfactual that
accounts for the choice of the particular patient (i.e., to consider
the alternative treatment that the claimant herself would have
chosen in light of her idiosyncratic preferences). Instead, patients
are required to prove causation based on the choice of the
“reasonable patient.”135 This practice empties the doctrine of
informed consent of its meaning. As we explained above,
physicians are already required to offer their patients a treatment
that complies with the preferences of the reasonable patient,
under their duty to offer proper care.136 Accordingly, if a patient
See supra note 39.
See, e.g., Spencer v. Goodill, No. 08C-06-183-RRC, 2009 WL 4652960, at *7–
8 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2009) (to prove causal connection, the plaintiff must show that
a hypothetical reasonable patient in the same position would have decided differently if
properly informed). Other jurisdictions require the plaintiff to prove both objective
“reasonable patient” causation and a subjective “particular patient” causation. See, e.g.,
Wissell v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc., No. 232-2-12 Cncv, 2014 Vt. Super. LEXIS
89, *14, *60 (Vt. Super. Ct. May 22, 2014) (stating that in Vermont the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove subjective causation, but that objective lack of causation is an
affirmative defense under Vermont’s law).
136 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
134

135
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succesfully proves that a reasonable person, in his or her
condition, would have chosen a different treatement than the one
that was chosen for him or her, this means that the physician
breached the duty to treat the patient reasonably. Applying the
but-for test by using the reasonable patient choice of treatment as
a counterfactual, therefore, enables the generic duty of care to
swallow any attempt to establish a claim of informed consent,
thereby turning this doctrine into a meaningless rule.
Thus, it becomes clear that the current test of causation
does not detect the harm resulted to patients from either losing
their sense of control or losing the benefit associated with
choosing the best alternative. We do not suggest, however, that
the requirenment of causation in cases of informed consent
should be dismissed alltogether. Rather, we propose that this
requirment should be adjusted to the nature of these types of
harms. Consider first the harm of losing the sense of control. This
harm does not depend on what choice the patient would have
made were he or she presented with all the alternative
treatments.137 The reason is that the harm resulted to the
patient from losing her sense of control occurred when he or she
was deprived of the opportunity to make an informed choice
about the treatment, before making the actual choice. Therefore,
the requirement of causation for this type of harm is fulfilled
whenever a court finds that a physician breached his or her duty
of disclosure toward the patient.
By contrast, the proof of harm resulting from being
deprived of the opportunity to choose the best alternative depends
on a patient’s ability to prove his or her idiosyncratic preferences;
that is, to prove that in light of the unique set of preferences, he or
she would have chosen a different treatement than the one actually
administered. As explained earlier, however, a plaintiff would find
it very difficult to prove that he or she has unique, idiosyncratic
preferences—especially considering the preponderance of the
evidence standard, which requires the patient to prove a
probability of over 50% that he or she would have chosen a different
treatement. In most cases, patients would struggle to reach this
level of probability, and therefore would almost never succeed in
their claims for breach of informed consent. Correspondingly,
physicians would systematically escape from liablity for a type of
harm resulting from breaching their duty of disclosure.
To accommodate these difficulties, we suggest that courts
set the compensation for this type of harm according to the
probability that the patient would have chosen a different
137

The same is true for the loss of opportunity to express oneself through choice.

2019]

RESHAPING THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

411

treatment. To illustrate, consider Example 1.2. above. Assume
that Mary tells John only about Treatment A, while omitting
mention of Treatments B and C. Assume further that the court
finds that Mary breached her duty to inform John appropriately,
since evidently, she should have informed John about Treatment
B as well. In this case, if it can be assumed that eight out of ten
patients in John’s condition would choose Treatment A, and only
two out of ten would favor Treatment B, then we propose that
the damages should be estimated according to the probability
that John would have prefered Treatment B over Treatment A
(which is, in this illustration, a probability of 20%). The idea of
discounting damages by the probability of causal link between
the breach and the harm has been adopted in other situations of
medical malpractice in which causation is difficult to prove.138
Although this solution does not reflect the harm caused to a
specific patient who was deprived of the choice of treatment, we
believe it is better than a state in which patients are not
compensated at all for being deprived of the opportunity to
choose the best treatment for them specifically.
C.

Adjusting the Award of Damages

Whenever the court determines that a physician breaches
her duty, there should be a prima facie case for compensation—
regardless of whether the patient would have chosen the same
treatment but for the physician’s breach of disclosure. The reason
for this is that the harm to the patient’s sense of control occurs
whenever the physician breaches the duty of disclosure. In
addition, the patient also suffered harm as a result of losing the
benefit of choosing the best alternative.139 This inference is
supported by our suggestion to evaluate this type of harm based

138 The most prominent example is the “loss of chance” doctrine, under which
when a physician negligently reduces the patient’s chances to recover from his or her
ailment (by misdiagnosing her, for example), and it is impossible to prove that the patient
would have recovered had he or she been treated reasonably, the patient is entitled to
damages according to the probability that he or she did not recover as a result of the
physician’s negligence. See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 185–86 (Kan. 1994)
(holding that the patient may recover damages for loss of chance, but that the diminished
degree of recovery must be a substantial one); Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget
Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476–77 (Wash. 1983) (holding that a 36% reduction in the decedent’s
chance for survival comprised sufficient evidence to allow the case to go to the jury). For
support of applying a probabilistic rule to lost chance of recovery cases, see Joseph H. King,
Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting
Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1382 (1981).
139 Furthermore, if the choice has an expressive function, the patient loses the
opportunity to express herself whenever the physician breaches her duty to inform.
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on the probability that the patient would have chosen an
alternative treatment that was not offered by the physician.140
Since the patient, however, should only be compensated for
the net harm caused to her from the breach of the duty of disclosure,
courts should offset the amount in damages by the costs that were
saved to the patient as a result of that breach. In particular, the
damages should be lessened by two sorts of benefits incidentally
conferred upon the patient as a result of the physician’s breach;
namely, the reduction in the probability of mistake, and in the sense
of regret. Notably, in most cases, even after offsetting the benefits
that resulted from the physician’s breach of duty, the patient is
expected to remain with some level of harm. This result is evident
from the court’s decision that the standard of disclosure was
breached, as the standard itself reflects the aggregation of all the
benefits and costs related to the breach and indicates that the costs
that the breach created exceed its benefits.
In contrast, we propose that when the choice of treatment
is based mainly on the possible risks associated with each
treatment, the patient should be entitled to compensation for
losing the opportunity to choose the best alternative only if the
risk from the treatment that was actually administered
materializes. To illustrate, consider again Example 1.2, and
assume that John is a baseball pitcher. Remember that
Treatment B creates a risk of permanent harm to his arm. In
this case, from an ex ante perspective, it is reasonable to assume
that John might prefer Treatment C to Treatment B (since the
former does not expose him to similar risk). This conclusion,
however, changes from an ex post perspective, if we know that
John underwent Treatment B, but the risk to his arm did not
materialize. In that case, John lost nothing from being unable to
choose the best treatment for himself.
Admittedly, it is hard (and maybe even impossible) to
develop a neat formula that offers a precise estimation of the net
harm to a patient deprived of informed choice. This should not,
however, prevent courts from applying their best judgment to
assess the damages of the harm caused to patients. The alternative
would be leaving the right to informed choice utterly unprotected.
Moreover, at present, courts frequently contend with subjective
evaluations when they award compensation for pain and
suffering.141 As these cases illustrate, when instructing juries to
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Scaccetti, 927 A.2d 1269, 1283 (N.J. 2007) (“[M]odel jury
instructions on pain and suffering recognize the inherently subjective nature of the
damage-calculation process.”).
140

141
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estimate the damages to a patient deprived of informed choice,
courts should acknowledge the subjective nature of the
compensation requested and instruct the juries about relevant
considerations, while granting them a “high degree of discretion.”142
In conclusion, we argue that the sum of compensation in
cases of informed consent should reflect the net harm resulted to
the patient from being deprived of informed choice. This
compensation should take into account both the costs and the
benefits associated with the physician’s breach of duty toward the
patient.143 Notably, the costs sometimes might be rather minor—
especially if the estimation of the patient’s loss of the opportunity
to choose the best alternative turns out particularly small. As
mentioned above, when the patient’s choice is based on the risks
associated with each alternative, the patient will suffer from this
type of harm only when the risk actually materializes. In these
cases, we suggest compensating the patient for the breach of
informed consent only if he or she also suffers from a physical harm
as a result of the physician’s breach, for two reasons: first, since
there is no lost benefit of choosing the best alternative, the loss of
sense of control might be completely offset by the saved costs, i.e.,
the reduced probability of making a mistake and the reduction in
the sense of regret. Second, even if the net harm caused to the
patient is positive, it would probably be very small, and thus not
worth pursuing given the substantial costs of litigation.
Compensating patients for the harm caused to them by the
breach of the duty of disclosure requires first to determine what
the appropriate level of disclosure is. In the next section we
explain that the duty of disclosure cannot be determined
objectively, but rather must reflect the understanding that
patients vary both in their desire to take active roles in the choice
of their treatments, and in the benefits and costs that this choice
entails for them.

142 Similar instructions are given to juries when calculating damages for pain
and suffering. See, e.g., Jastram ex rel. Jastram v. Kruse, 962 A.2d 503, 510–11 (N.J.
2008) (citing Johnson, 927 A.2d at 1282–83).
143 If the patient can show that he or she would have chosen a different treatment
than the one provided, and as a result would have avoided some physical harm, he or she
should be compensated for her physical harm as well. The suggested calculation of
damages, however, should take into account the reduction of risk that the alternate
treatment would have created. See Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 243,
245–46, 258 (2007) (arguing that in cases where a negligent defendant had to choose
between two risky options, courts should offset damages by the risk that was not imposed
on the victim from the reasonable option).
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Accommodating the Level of Disclosure to the Patient

Patients vary in their need to be involved in the process
of choosing their treatment. This intuition is supported by
studies based on both qualitative144 and quantitative research
methodologies.145 These studies confirm that while some patients
prefer to play a dominant role in choosing their treatment,
others prefer their physician to make this choice for them.
Furthermore, some studies suggest that when patients prefer
not to take an active part in the choice of treatment, but
nonetheless are required to do so, they not only benefit less from
making this choice, but also show less interest in the risks and
advantages of the proposed treatments.146 The latter finding
indicates that patients who do not wish to choose their
treatment are more susceptible to making mistakes, potentially
resulting in a treatment less suited to their set of preferences.
Considering these findings, we propose that the duty of
disclosure should not be designed objectively. Instead, it should
reflect the understanding that while some patients should take
an active role in the choice of their treatment, for others, the
process of choice making is too costly. To the extent that the law
aims to protect both patients’ right to choose and their well-being,
we propose that the level of disclosure should accommodate to the
particular patient. Therefore, the scope of disclosure should be
limited in the case of patients for whom the choice of treatment is
too consuming. For such patients, the physician should serve as
the primary choice maker.
The difficulty of this proposal is mostly practical.
Admittedly, requiring physicians to estimate the negative and
positive effects that a choice of treatment may create for any of
their patients is extremely costly and hardly feasible. Furthermore,
physicians would never be held liable for offering too much
144 See, e.g., Linda Brom, et al., Patients’ Preferences for Participation in
Treatment Decision-Making at the End of Life: Qualitative Interviews with Advanced
Cancer Patients, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 2, 6 (2014) https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=
10.1371/journal.pone.0100435 [https://perma.cc/8RF8-Z7YJ] (in-depth interviews
conducted with patients reveal variance in the extent of involvement different patients
prefer in treatment decision making. Individual patients’ preferences may change in the
course of the illness, with a shift to more active participation in the later phases).
145 See, e.g., Wendy Levinson et al., Not All Patients Want to Participate in
Decision Making: A National Study of Public Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531,
531–34 (2005) (A “population-based study demonstrat[ing] that people vary . . . in their
preferences for participation in decision making”).
146 See Patricia Kenney et al., Participation in Treatment Decision-Making by
Women with Early Stage Breast Cancer, 2 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 159, 161–67 (1999)
(showing that patients differ in their desire to participate in the choice of treatment, and
that patients who want to take on a less active role had difficulties establishing
preferences for the risks and benefits of treatments).
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information to their patient, while they might be liable for offering
too little. Therefore, physicians would often prefer to act
defensively by offering an excessive amount of information to their
patients, even if they suspect that such a load might become too
consuming for them; otherwise, they might expose themselves to
litigation for breach of informed consent. Hence, we suggest below
several methods to identify patients’ benefits and costs resulting
from their exposure to an increased amount of information, while
considering the physicians’ hardship in assessing these benefits
and costs on their own.
The first method that we offer is based on the idea that
patients’ desires could be used as an indicative tool to estimate
the positive and negative effects that the process of choosing
creates for them. The reasoning underlying this idea is that
patients often (though not always)147 are aware that a decision
they face is too overwhelming for them. In these cases, we suggest
that the regime of informed consent becomes more attentive to
patients’ instincts, by adjusting the scope of medical disclosure to
the level of information to which they are ready to be exposed,
even if it reduces that exposure to zero.148 To illustrate, consider
that John, the patient from Example 1.2, is intimidated by
making significant choices regarding his medical condition. He is
both dreadfully afraid of the thought of regretting his choice, and
aware of his tendency to become severely exhausted from difficult
choices—hence, his state increases the probability of making the
mistake of choosing the wrong treatment for himself. In this case,
John might want Mary, his physician, to choose the treatment for
him. Under the current law, however, John is not allowed to opt
out of the broad disclosure regime. At present, physicians are not
allowed to limit the information they reveal to their patients, or
to provide only a subset of the possible alternative treatments,
even at the patient’s behest.
Admittedly, allowing patients to opt out of the informed
consent regime might, in itself, become a consuming decision to
make; namely, it requires that patients choose the extent of their
exposure to their own medical information. As explained below,
however, we contend that overall, the benefits of an opt-out
147 The next methods we offer apply to patients who might be not fully informed
about the costs and benefits of choice, or who are not rational.
148 That is, accepting a patient’s choice not to choose, at least to some extent,
when they expect that being actively involved in their treatment will most likely increase
their pain and suffering. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 54, at 10 (referring to patients who
choose not to take an active role in a decision regarding their medical treatment as
“optional autonomists”). Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit refer to choosing-not-to-choose
as a second-order decision. See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, SecondOrder Decisions 110 ETHICS 5, 10 (1999).
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regime exceed its cons. First, an opt-out regime is extremely
beneficial to patients who tend to experience exceptionally
negative effects when they are required to make difficult choices.
The law should allow such patients to ask for limited disclosure
of information and declare that in cases of severe illnesses, they
can delegate the decisions regarding their treatments to their
physician. The second advantage of an opt-out regime is that it
reduces the overall choice-making costs by shifting most of them
from the patients to their physicians. This shift of burden is
efficient, since compared to their patients, physicians bear less
costs when acquiring information about the optional treatments
and are expected to suffer less from regret in the process of
choosing between them.149 Simply put, the opt-out regime
enables patients to shift the choice of treatment to the “cheapest
choice makers,” who are the physicians.150
The problem with the opt-out solution is that the patients
who are expected to benefit the most from it are also the patients
who might hesitate the most before asking to limit the amount
of information they are exposed to. In fact, empirical studies
indicate that this sort of hesitation in the face of a complex
decision might cause patients to refrain from making the choice
of opting out altogether.151 In this case, many patients might
stick to the default regime of disclosure, even though it is less
beneficial for them. To contend with this result, a different
method should be considered, namely, an opt-in regime, which
manifests the mirror image of the opt-out regime considered
above. The method of opt-in exemplifies a use of “nudges”—a
mechanism that exploits the costs of choice making to encourage
people to make what is perceived as the desirable choice for
149 In general, choosing for others, as opposed to oneself, is less depleted because
it is associates with more positive feelings (people enjoy choosing for others). See Evan
Polman & Kathleen D. Vohs, Decision Fatigue, Choosing for Other, and Self-Construal,
7 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 471, 472 (2016).
150 We use the term “cheapest choice maker” as a particular implementation of
Calabresi’s notion of “cheapest cost avoider.” See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 143–44 (1970). This term refers to the
party who is able to minimize the negative externalities of an accident most efficiently.
This approach aligns with the economic goal of tort law, which is to reduce both the
number of accidents and the costs of their prevention. We contend that allowing the
physician to make the decision only if the patient requests to opt out of informed consent
will decrease the risk of a mistaken shift of choice making; i.e., that the choice would be
shifted to a physician when in fact the cheapest decision-maker is the patient.
151 When faced with complex decisions, choice makers might opt for the default
without giving enough thought to the alternatives. See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson & Daniel
Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338 (2003) (showing that the choice
whether or not to be an organ donor largely depend on the default—where the default is
to donate, most people do not choose to opt out, and when the default is not to donate
only few choose to opt in).
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them, while enabling them to make a different choice if they so
desire.152 In the present context, the opt-in method assumes that
many patients who want to narrow their involvement in medical
decision making might not do so due to the high costs that this
complicated decision entails.153 Hence, such a method would set
the default rule for the patients on the opposite pole, whereby
the physicians present to the patient a very limited set of
alternatives to choose from, unless the patients express their
desire to opt in to the wider regime of disclosure, allowing them
greater involvement in the decision-making process.154
Interestingly, this description correlates with the reality
experienced by many patients. Studies show that people tend to
assume that they would like to make the decision regarding
their course of treatment in the event of a serious illness, but
when the time actually comes to make a decision, most prefer
that their physician make the choice for them.155
The last method we present here, namely, personalized
disclosure, differs substantially from both the opt-out and opt-in
mechanisms discussed thus far. Contrary to the previous
methods, it neutralizes the participation of both the patient and
the physician in the decision regarding the extent of disclosure.
This method involves the use of statistical data to
approximate the preferred amount of disclosure of the particular
patient. Studies have shown that patients’ preferences to become
more involved in the process of choice making are influenced by
both demographic variables (e.g., younger, more educated, female
patients have consistently shown a greater desire to take an
active role in making choices concerning their treatments) and
medical variables (“experienced patients” with a severe diagnosis

152 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 107, 110 (identifying default
enrollment programs as a “nudge” mechanism that “channels” people in the right
direction by removing barriers).
153 Studies support this conclusion. See, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea,
The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J.
ECON. 1149, 1176 (2001) (analyzing the 401(k) saving behavior of employees before and after
the change in law and concluding that the 401(k) participation rate significantly rose under
automatic enrollment, although none of the economic features of the plan changed); see also
Iyengar & Lepper, supra note 109, at 1004 (referring to studies supporting the conclusion
according to which “the more choosers perceive their choice-making task to necessitate expert
information, the more they may be inclined not to choose, and further, they may even
surrender the choice to someone else—presumably more expert.”).
154 Up to the possibility of having a full disclosure of medical information and
making the choice by themselves.
155 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 54, at 32–33, 116 (reviewing studies that indicate
a fundamental gap between what patients seem to want before they face a need to choose
their own medical treatment, and their wants when they actually face the need to make
such a choice).
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tend to prefer an active role in the choice-making process).156 By
utilizing existing information about patients’ preferences and
developing new tools using big data,157 physicians may be able to
differentiate between patients according to their expected desire
to be exposed to medical information and to take an active role in
the process of choosing their treatments.
At a later stage, we believe that the suggested statistical
approach—which accommodates the level of disclosure to patients’
preferences regarding choice making—will be replaced by one that
is aimed to predict the positive and negative effects that the choice
of treatment creates for different patients. This statistical approach
will enable the law to personalize the level of disclosure effectively
by considering the personal costs and benefits resulting to particular
patients from the process of choosing, rather than relying on their
stated preferences. Furthermore, this approach will allow
physicians to concentrate their efforts on offering the best care they
can to their patients, by exempting them from the excessive need to
assess the correct amount of disclosure for each patient.
CONCLUSION
To date, legal scholars and courts have been fairly silent
in the vibrant discussion on the value of choice in medical
settings. This article seeks to fill in this gap by constructing a
basic framework to analyze the duty of disclosure based on
insights from psychology and behavioral economics regarding the
benefits and costs of making choices.

156 See Rebecca Say, Madeleine Murtagh & Richard Thomson, Patients’
Preference for Involvement in Medical Decision Making: A Narrative Review, 60 PATIENT
EDUC. & COUNS. 102, 102–03, 109 (2006) (using meta-analysis from several qualitative
and quantitative studies to show which parameters influence patients’ desire to be
involved in medical decision making); see also A. Robinson & R. Thomson, Variability in
Patient Preferences for Participating in Medical Decision Making: Implications for the
Use of Decision Support Tools, 10 QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE i34, i34 (2001) (showing that
patients’ preferences regarding participation vary and that clinicians perform poorly in
assessing their patients’ preferences, while patients perform poorly in estimating the
effect of their involvement).
157 Big data is commonly defined as the process whereby computers sift through
enormous quantities of data to identify patterns that can predict individuals’ future
behavior. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126
HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2021 (2013). For recent use of big data in the legal arena, see, e.g.,
Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry,
62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013) (identifying applications of big data to the legal profession and
suggesting its utility in different legal settings). For a recent implementation of this idea
in negligence cases, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law,
91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 627, 636, 687 (2016). For a proposal to personalize disclosure to
patients by using big data, see Porat & Strahilevitz, supra note 71, at 1470–76.
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This article shows that the doctrine of informed consent,
in its current form, is meaningless. The protection that it
provides is already covered by the duty of physicians to treat
their patients with proper care. To transform this doctrine into
a useful tool for protecting patients’ right to informed choice, we
suggest both narrowing and expanding its implementation. On
the one hand, the present doctrine is too wide, since it requires
physicians to disclose to their patients all the alternative
treatments for their ailment. This article shows that this
requirement does not comply with scientific evidence regarding
the costs that the process of choice making entails for people in
general and for patients in particular. As such, we propose that
the duty to inform a patient of alternative treatments should
apply only insofar as such information is beneficial for the
patient. When providing information about an alternative
treatment creates more harm than benefit, depriving the patient
of that information should not constitute a wrong in itself.
On the other hand, the doctrine of informed consent is too
narrow, since its current examination of causation does not take
into account the benefits that the process of choice making
entails for the patient. Accordingly, this article argues that a
patient should be entitled to compensation for breach of
informed consent even if he or she cannot prove that, but for the
breach, he or she would have chosen a different treatment.
Furthermore, this article suggests that when a physician is
found liable for breaching her duty of disclosure, the court should
award compensation in the amount corresponding to the net loss
resulted from this breach. This article also suggests practical
guidelines to evaluate this loss. Finally, this article sets forth the
argument that the duty of disclosure should be adjusted to the
magnitude of the effect that the choice-making process has on the
particular patient. A subjective standard of disclosure could be
achieved by setting a default level of disclosure and allowing
patients to change it, if they wish to do so. A more sophisticated
approach aims to personalize the level of disclosure by coordinating
it with the estimated costs and benefits that the increase in the
magnitude of disclosure creates for a particular patient, based on
big data methods. As the application of big data to legal standards
is in its infancy, more targeted research regarding the various costs
and benefits of choice may be beneficial for personalizing the
doctrine of informed consent.

